Contrasts in growth and development : New England versus Atlantic Canada by Morley, Fred
Permission has been granted 
to the National Library of 
Canada to microfilm this 
thesis and to lend or sell 
copies of the film.
L'autorisation a été accordée 
à la Bibliothèque nationale 
du Canada de microfilmer 
cette thèse et de prêter ou 
de vendre des exemplaires du 
film.
The author (copyright owner) 
h a s  r e s e r v e d  o t h e r  
publication rights, and 
neither the thesis nor 
extensive extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without his/her 
written permission.
L*auteur (titulaire du droit 
d'auteur) se réserve les 
autres droits de publication; 
ni la thèse ni de longs 
extraits de celle-ci ne 
doivent être imprimés ou 
autrement reproduits sans son 
autorisation écrite.
ISBN 0-315-55680-3
CONTRASTS IN GROWTH AND DEV3L0PMENT: 
NEW ENGLAND VERSUS ATLANTIC CANADA
c. FRED MORLEY, 1988
A thesis submitted by Fred Motley In partial 
fulfillment of the Requirements for Masters of Arts 
Degree in Atlantic Canada Studies 











Chapter I —  Introduction .................................. 1
Overview .................................................  1
Footnotes ...............................................  4
Cliapter II —  New England and Atlantic C a n a d a ...........  6
Introduction ............................................. ®
Demographics ............................................. ®
H i s t o r y ................................................. 10
Industrial Structure ...................................  13
Regional Growth Patterns ............................... 16
Northern New E n g l a n d ...................................  24
Conclusion............................................  26
F o o t n o t e s ............................................  28
Chapter III —  Theories of Growth and Development . . .  31
Introduction ............................................  31
What is a R e g i o n ? ...................................  31
Regional Growth Theory ............................. 32
Theoretical Parameters ...............................  34
General Equilibrium .................................  34
Keynesian..........................................  38
M a r x ................................................. 40
Orthodox Explanations of Regional Growth ...........  43
Introduction ...................................... 43
Staples............................................  44
Export/Economic Base A p p r o a c h....................  47
The Developmental Approach/Modernization Theory . 47
Regional Science Approach ........................  49
Introduction .................................... 49
Central Place ...................................  50
Growth Poles ...................................... 51
Agglomeration Economies ........................  51
Transfer Dependency .................................  53
Non traditional Growth Theories ......................  54
Cumulative Causation .............................  54
Polarized Development ...............................  56
Left Nationalist Position ..........................  57
Small Is B e a u t i f u l ...............................  58
Schumpeterian A p p r o a c h ........................... 59
Introduction .................................... 59
The Entrepreneurial Approach ................  61
Neo-Schumpeterian Approach ....................  62
Voluntaristic Development ........................  63
Son of Dependency or Province-Building Model . . 64
Radical Explanations of Growth and Underdevelopment 65
Introduction ........................................  65
Dependency Theory, the International Debate . . .  66
Regional Underdevelopment and Dependency . . . .  69
II
Conclusion............................................  71
F o o t n o t e s ............................................  71
Chapter IV —  Reasons for G r o $ f t h......................  78
Introduction ..........................................  78
Background to Growth in New E n g l a n d ...............  79
Agglomeration Economies ............................. B6
Economic Base and Economic Linkages.............  86
Historical Developments ......................  86
Dynamic Linkages Between Sectors .............  92
Proximity to Markets ..........................  94
Defence Spending .................................  96
P r o c u r e m e n t ...................................  96
Research and Development ......................  106
P e r s o n n e l ........................................ 107
Business Investment ...............................  Ill
Introduction ...................................  Ill
Venture Capital ............................... 113
Banking Systems: U.S. Versus Canada ......... 117
Educational Institutions ........................  124
Introduction ...................................  124
Labour Force Quality ..........................  126
Innovative Environment ........................  131
Economic Rationalization and Adjustment ...........  139
I n t r o d u c t i o n .....................................  139
Rationalization In the Manufacturing Sector . . .  141
The Process of A d j u s t m e n t .......................141
Barriers to Adjustment........................  147
Wages and S a l a r i e s ............................... 152
Business Environment ............................. 156
Ta x a t i o n ........................................ 156
Innovation............................................  162
Introduction .....................................  162
Entrepreneurship.................................  166
Research and Develoimient...........   170
Government Programs ............................... 176
Assistance to Business ........................  176
P r o c u r e m e n t ...................................  181
F o o t n o t e s ............................................  165
Chapter V —  Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s .................. 192
Ill
LIST OF TABLES
1 Area and Population The Atlantic Provinces
and New England (1980-81) 9
2 Growth of Population Atlantic Provinces and
New England (1960/51 - 1960/81) 17
3 Population Growth Atlantic Provinces and
New England (1969/83 and 1979/83) 18
4 Employment Growth Atlantic Provinces and
New England (1969/83 and 1979/83) 20
5 Unemployment Rates Atlantic Provinces and
New England (1975/1979/1983) 21
6 Earned Income Per Person And Growth Rates 
Atlantic Provinces and New England
(1969-1983) 22
7 New England State Business Tax Burdens 
(percent of net business income going to taxes)
(1977) 26
8 Distance Prom Halifax to Selected Cities 95
9 United States Department of Defence Contract Awards
By State and Region ($ millions) (1980-85) 97
10 Defence Specialties of the New England States in 1980 98
11 Department of National Defence Capital Expenditures
(1980-81 Fiscal Year) 100
12 Inter-Regional Trade Flows Per Dollar of Defence
Procurement Expenditures (1982-1983) 101
13 Project Authorisation Under The Defence
Industry Productivity Program (1982-83. fiscal year) 103
14 United States Department of Defence Personnel
By State and Region (1985) 106
15 DND Employment in Person Years Atlantic Provinces
and Canada (1985-86 fiscal year) 107
16 Regional Distribution Of Capital Commitments 
(Independent Private Firms Only
as a Percent of the Total) 112
17 Bank and Branch Density Various
Industrialized Countries (1982) 116
IV
18 Years of School Completed By Region, and State 1Ü4
19 Percentage Distribution of Population 15 Years 
and Older By highest Level of Schooling
Atlantic Provinces and Canada 126
20 Enrollment in Post-Secondary Institutions 
As a Percent of the Population by Age Group
and By Province 127
21 Department of Defence Research and Development 
Contracts To Colleges, Dniversities and Nonprofit 
Organisations in New England 130
22 Research and Development Expenditures At 
Doctorate-Granting Institutions In
New England (1985) 131
23 Percent Distribution of Research and Development 
Expenditures At Doctorate-Granting Institutions
By source of Fund and State (1985) 132
24 The Top Ten Endowments of Educational Institutions
In New England as of January 1986 133
25 Research and Development Expenditures
In Canadian Higher Education Institutions
By Source of Funding (1984) 134
26 Growth in Total Manufaoturing Employment 
Atlantic Provinces and Canada
(1961, 1971, 1981) 142
27 Average Weekly Unemployment Insurance Benefits
For New England and Canada (U.S. dollars) (1985) 145
28 Extent of Union Membership In New England,
Atlantic Canada, United States and Canada
(1980-81) 147
29 Average Hourly Earnings of Manufacturing 
Production Workers In Selected States
Relative to the U.S. Average 149
30 Average Hourly Earnings of Manufacturing 
Production Workers By Province, Relative
to the Canadian Average. 151
31 State Business Taxes
Percent of Net Business Income Given to Taxes
And Rank (1977) 153
32 Individual Income Taxes As a Percent of
Personal Income 154
33 Taxes Payed Per Person By State and Region 156
34 Provincial Tax Rates 157
35 Federal Obligations for Research and Development
For New England (1973-85) 167
36 Research and Development Expenditures 
By Leading Private Sector Companies
In New England 168
37 Research and Development Expenditures In Canada
By Source of Funding (1984) 169
38 Federal Research and Development Expenditures 
By Major Category For the Atlantic Provinces
(1978-79) 171
39 Public Sector Spending In Canada (1979) 180
VI
Liât, of . Eirngftg
Figure Eagfi
1 High Technology Sectors 83
2 Service Industries 84
3 Industrial Diffusion in New England 1790-1900 88
4 The Diffusion Process in Recent New England History 89
5 Growth Patterns of Selected Secondary Manufacturing
Companies in the Atlantic Provinces 90
6 Growth Patterns of Iron and Steel Industries
In Atlantic Canada 91
7 New England Companies in Fortune 500
Ranked By Sales 93
8 Atlantic Canadian Companies In Financial
Post 500 and Atlantic Business 500 95
9 Change in Manufacturing Employment in New England 144
VII
AB5TBAGI
CONTRASTS IN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT:
NEW ENGLAND VERSUS ATLANTIC CANADA, 
by J. Fred Morley, April 1988.
This work compares patterns of development and 
underdevelopment in New England and Atlantic Canada.
Certain similarities in history and geography have invited 
speculation on the cause of very different growth paths 
observed. This thesis examines the notion that keys to 
rapid growth in one region can be identified and applied in 
a direct way to solve the problems of an underdeveloped 
economy in a different region.
The methodology used to examine the validity of this 
proposition involves a statistical comparison of the two 
regions, an extensive review of theories of development and 
the identification of those most consistent with the pattern 
of growth In New England. The New England economy is then 
analyzed in terms of certain growth factors within relevant 
theoretical parameters. This methodology allows for a 
review of the relevance of these theories and factors to the 
problems of Atlantic Canada. The findings point to the 
difficulty of attributing growth to one theory or one factor 
in isolation. Growth is best explained by recognizing that 
the various elements of growth are interdependent. In this 
sense, the New England economy is unique. Few direct policy 
applications exist for Atlantic Canada.
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INTRODUCTION
The Atlantic Provinces, by virtue of similar geography, 
population roots, and historic ties, are widely considered 
to be similar to New England. As a consequence, the recent 
turnaround of the New England economy, in contrast with the 
experience in Atlantic Canada, has invited analysis and 
speculation on the cause of the very different growth paths 
observed[l]. The notion that by identifying the keys to the 
rebirth of the New England economy that these can be 
applied, in a more or less direct way, to the Atlantic 
economy has become popular among policy makers and their 
bosses. This avenue of investigation has arisen in response 
to the distinct lack of success of a host of regional 
development policies, focusing more or less on Atlantic 
Canada, that have come and gone over the past thirty 
yearn [2.1.
The simple notion that growth and underdevelopment are 
different sides of the same coin is consistent with theories 
of international development in the developmental or 
modernistic mold. This paradigm in its simplest form states 
that by looking at the observable differences between 
industrialized countries or regions and their underdeveloped 
counterparts, growth factors can be isolated and applied 
directly to an underdeveloped economy, with positive 
results. Experience in the Atlantic provinces and elsewhere
demonstrates that growth and underdevelopment can not be 
described in two dimensions. However, by expanding our 
theoretical base we see that undervelopment can be described 
as a process as well as a state of the economy.
This study will attempt to demonstrate that growth in 
New England can be explained by a number of identifiable 
factors within a standard theoretical framework. This paper 
will also attempt to demonstrate that growth I5  a complex 
process, that factors contributing to growth can not be 
dealt with in isolation, and that, at least in New England, 
rapid economic growth is the result of a variety of factors 
working together. This study will propose that no single 
theory of economic development adequately explains the 
growth process as it is observed in the real world. The 
review of the literature and relevant macro-data is also 
designed to test the growth process as observed in Now 
England for generalities that may apply in Atlantic Canada. 
It is the general thesis of this study that the pattern of 
growth in a seemingly similar region. New England, does not 
offer a model of growth suitable to the problems of the 
Atlantic region. However, it is hoped that some lessons can 
be learned.
Problems of disparities between countries or regions 
have proven difficult to package neatly within the 
parameters of one theory or another. Theories, models and 
paradigms relating to regional growth and development span a 
broad spectrum of social science and are the subject of 
continuous debate, indeed conflict, among theorists. The
debate appoara less rigorous among policy makers however. 
Policy makers pick and choose from various theoretical camps 
based on diverse criteria of what has worked in the past, 
sox appeal, bureaucratic priorities and, apparently, a 
belief that every once in a while it is time for a change. 
Policies that confront disparities have met with little 
success and indeed some theories of economic growth see 
bureaucracy as a big part of the problem.
The success of theory of course, is measured by how 
accurately it models a given economy or economic situation. 
The resurgence of the Mew England economy and the continuing 
disparity between the Atlantic economy and the rest of 
Canada are the topic of the day. The Atlantic economy is 
the primary topic of concern. The New England miracle is 
often promoted as a model for growth in Canada and, by some, 
as a solution to regional disparity. The policy 
prescriptions depend on the theoretical interpretation 
placed on these events. For example: Is the cause of slow 
growth in Atlantic Canada the result of a failure to adjust 
to the decline of traditional industries through emigration 
(the neo-classical view)'? Is slow growth the result of a 
deficiency of capital, technology, human capital, and so on 
(the developmental school)? Or is the process of 
undervelopment the direct result of growth elsewh&re (the 
dependency school)? Newer theories have taken a more 
systemic approach[3], combining many of the existing
perspectives, while encompassing the policy process and 
results within its theoretical framework (neo-Schumpeterian 
approach).
Firstly this study will contrast basic economic 
indicators and historical trends in the two regions.
Secondly this study will review various theories and 
paradigms of regional growth and development. Third it will 
provide a review of the factors which in the consensus of 
many have caused the resurgence in the New England 
economy[4]. The study will attempt to determine how the 
conditions specified by these factors fit various 
theoretical perspectives. In the same light the same 
factors will be reviewed as to their possible application in 
Atlantic Canada. The fina] section will review the ability 
of theories and factors relevant to growth In New England to 
describe problems slow growth and disparity in Atlantic 
Canada.
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NEW ENGLAND AND ATLANTIC CANADA 
Introduction
According to popular wisdom, the Atlantic region and 
New England have many common features such as common 
sea-faring traditions, similar climate (four seasons), 
family ties from past migrations in both directions, common 
geography and close proximity, quasi political links[l], and 
a still strong if somewhat fading fanaticism where the 
Boston Red Sox are concerned. This perception of similarity 
has Invited analysis of the recent economic turnaround of 
New England, in contrast to a much different pattern in 
Atlantic Canada. It is hoped that through such analysis the 
factors that have contributed to the rejuvenation of the New 
England economy might be applied successfully Just a little 
further to the Northeast.
It appears, however, that these two regions are not as 
similar as common wisdom would have it. The two regions are 
very dissimilar in size, population, industrial structure 
and labour force characteristics. Indicators of economic 
performance show a dramatic contrast in the economic growth 
of the two regions during the past decade. In 1975, the 
unemployment rate in New England was 10.4 percent, higher
than that of Atlantic Canada at 9.8 percent. By mid 1987, 
New England had dropped to 3.3 percent (2.5 percent in New 
Hampshire) while in the Atlantic Region the unemployment 
rate had risen to over 15 percent (over 20 percent in 
Newfoundland). During the period from 1969 to 1983, the 
average per capita income in New England rose from 105 
percent to 111 percent of the national average. Over the 
same years, the average per capita income in Atlantic Canada 
rose from 67 percent to 71 percent of the national 
average[2].
Statistics, of course, do not tell the whole story.
The political and social fabric of New England differs from 
that of Atlantic Canada. Two features often associated with 
New England are an abundance of risk takers and political 
clout in the nation's capital. The opposite is probably 
true of Atlantic Canada[3].
While New England as a whole is very different from 
Atlantic Canada, uhe most northerly three states, it has 
been maintained, are more easily compared. It is difficult 
to isolate the influence of these states from those to the 
south, however. This will be discussed later.
Policies derived from observation of New England's 
growth record are probably not useful if they are predicated 
on the popular notion that "what works there should work 
hero". However there are lessons to be learned. It is 
useful to demonstrate what could work in revitalizing a 
region. It is also important to know what will not.
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Demographics
The New England region consists of six states: Maine, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and 
Connecticut while the Atlantic provinces include: 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick. Together the two regions stretch 
across much of the seaboard of the Atlantic Northeast.
New England has an area of Almost 67,000 Square miles, 
representing 1.8 percent of the land area of the United 
States. Atlantic Canada, by comparison, has an area just 
over 208,000 square miles, representing 5.4 percent of 
Canada’s land area. Labrador, the mai land portion of 
Newfoundland, represents over half of this area.
The population of New England was almost 12.4 million, 
5.5 percent of the U.S. population in 1980, compared to 
Atlantic Canada’s 2.2 million, representing 9.1 percent of 
the Canadian population in 1981. While New England is one of 
the smallest regions in the United States in terms of 
population, it is also the smallest in terms of size. 
Population density is therefore high. Rhode Island, 
Massachusetts and Connecticut rank second, third and fourth 
respectively, in population per square mile, among the 
states of the Union While the Atlantic region is more 
densely populated than Canada, the region’s density is about 
one twentieth that of New England. Table I provides some 
basic statistics on geography and population of individual
9
Table 1 
Area and Population 
The Atlantic Provinces and New England 
(1980-81)
Area(l) Population(2) Population 
sq.mi. (000) per sq.mi.
Newfoundland: Island 43,359 562 3.6
Labrador 112,825
Prince Edward Island 2,184 121 55.4
Nova Scotia 21,425 838 39.1
New Brunswick 28,354 689 24.3
Atlantic Provinces 208,147 2,210 10.6
Canada 3,831,012 24,343 6.4
Atlantic Provinces
as a % of Canada 5.4% 9.1%
Maine 33,215 1,125 33.9
New Hampshire 9,304 921 99.0
Vermont 9,609 511 53.2
Massachusetts 8,257 5,737 694.8
Rhode Island 1,214 947 780.1
Connecticut 5,009 3,108 620.5
New England 66,608 12,348 185.4
United States 3,618,467 226,505 62.6
New England as a
% of the United States 1.8% 5.5%
1) Includes fresh water areas.
2) Canadian population 1981, U.S. population 1980. 
Source: Statistics Canada; U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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States and provinces. (More expensive detail on a state by 
state and province by province basis is found in Appendix 
A).
History
The economic histories of New England and Atlantic 
Canada have similar colonial roots revolving about similar 
resource bases. Political and economic influences of the 
previous century set them on much different courses as they 
moved into the twentieth century.
The important industries in New England of the 
nineteenth century had their origins in the craft industries 
of colonial times[4]. Small mills producing tools, metal 
products, furniture, and textiles were spread throughout the 
region. Skills in machine making, metal working and wood 
working were without equal in the United States. 
Entrepreneurship and Yankee ingenuity could almost be 
considered cultural features of the region. This provided 
the industrial base for the rapid growth of the nineteenth 
century.
Investment capital was available from merchants 
involved in overseas trade. Entrepreneurs, many of whom had 
cut their teeth in the risky environment of trading, were 
also in abundance. Starting from this solid base New 
England industry grew through inter industry linkages, 
industry spinning off industry and so on, while benefiting
11
from the agglomeration effects of proximity to markets, 
related industries, and trained workers. The success in New 
England of translating merchant capital to industrial 
capital is in sharp contrast to the theories of development 
promoted by some[5].
Towards the end of the nineteenth century. New England 
and the United States as a whole came upon hard times. 
Over-capacity in industry, stimulated an unprecedented 
period of consolidation of industrial control. From 1886 to 
1905 the slae of the largest hundred firms in the nation 
quadrupled!6]. The traditional industries of the region, 
already hurt by the lure of a less militant and less 
class-conscious workforce in the Deep South, suffered. As 
traditional sectors declined, the development of a high 
technology base was already well established. In 1923, the 
electrical machinery industry in Massachusetts was already 
the third largest employer with 26,000 workers and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) had already 
spun-off firms like Raytheon and E(3&G[7].
Atlantic Canada had much the same economic roots.
After prosperous years of trading and resource exploitation, 
the region's business people turned to more industrial 
pursuits with the passing of the era of "wooden ships and 
iron men". By the end of the 1880's the region was well 
established, and in some cases national leaders, in 
industries such as sugar refining, textiles, glass making, 
rope and cordage manufacturing, candy making, iron and 
steel, and so on[8].
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This Industrial base did not last. By 1920, much that 
had grown up between 1880 and 1914 had disappeared. Colin 
D. Howell[9] points to three main reasons for this 
'deindustrialization’: the nation-wide consolidation of 
Industry, the lack of access to capital by local 
entrepreneurs, and the demise of a regionally oriented 
preferential freight rate structure.
The National Policy of 1876, which erected a Canadian 
tariff in response to American actions, served to stimulate 
growth in the Atlantic region and across Canada[10]. It also 
encouraged a degree of overcapitalization and over capacity, 
which led to wholesale dumping of cheap central Canadian 
goods on Atlantic markets. Consolidation and outright 
closure of many firms in the region was the inevitable 
result.
Consolidation was also evident among financial 
institutionst11]. Banks that had their roots in the region 
began to look Increasingly outward, both in terms of 
loan-making and expansion. Significant disparities existed 
between deposits and loans made in the region. Eventually 
the head offices of the surviving few moved[12].
The elimination of preferential freight rates for goods 
heading east, early In this century, hurt the 
competitiveness of Atlantic Industry in central markets. 
Preferential rates were put in place, under the terms of 
Confederation[13], to compensate for the diversion of trade 
from its natural and historic north-south orientation.
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It Is Interesting to note that three factors which 
contributed to New England’s emergence as an Industrial 
power “ an industrial base, access to capital, and access 
to markets - existed for a short while in Atlantic Canada. 
Their disappearance in Atlantic Canada, for mostly exogenous 
reasons, no doubt accounts for some of the differences 
between the two regions today.
Industrial Structure
The Industrial structures of the two regions are quite 
dissimilar, despite factors such as a "common sea faring 
i.radltlon". Broad differences also exist from province to 
province and state to state. In reference to Atlantic 
Canada, Harris and Warkentin comment:
This is a very complex region. It has no unifying 
configuration of physical features, and even the 
surrounding sea provides a matrix rather than a focus. 
There is no centralisation of economic activity or 
function, no rich heartland. If there Is any unity, 
it is a unity of mutual problems arising from the 
attempt to wrest from modest resources a standard of 
living roughly equivalent to that of the rest of 
Canada and the United States[14].
An August 1987 supplement to the Economist comments in a 
similar vein on New England:
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The economies of the six New England states are in 
many ways different. Connecticut has big companies 
doing big things: Submarines, jet engines, machine 
tools, insurance. Massachusetts has small companies 
doing small things: computer software venture 
capital. Rhode Island has both extremes: jewels and 
submarines, stately Newport and grim Pawtucket. In 
Maine, they live off the land: paper, leather 
lobsters, tourists. Vermont and New Hampshire are 
twins that try to be as different as they can.
Vermont is broader at its rural north; it makes cheese 
and maple syrup, and bans billboards. Granite New 
Hampshire is broader at its urban south and teems with 
small business and shopping malls[15].
Despite obvious differences within each of these regions 
There seem to be enough similarities that the term 'region' 
sticks.
The service sector is the most important component of 
the economies of both regions, a common feature of all 
post industrial societies. Resource-based manufacturing 
accounts for between 60 percent and 7C percent of all 
manufactured Employment in Atlantic Canada!IB]. In Now 
England, by contrast only about 10 percent of manufacturing 
is resource based[17]. New England has a weak resource 
base, while the Atlantic region remains very dependent on 
its primary industries. (Details of the Contribution of 
specific industries to the Gross Domestic Product of each 
province and state and country are found in Appendix B ) .
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New England’s service sector is smaller and slower 
growing than for the United States as a whole. The only 
exception is in the area of finance, insurance and real 
estate which accounted for 16.8 percent of the gross product 
of New England compared to 14.6 percent for the U.S.[18].
In contrast, New England’s manufacturing sector is 
considerably larger than the nation’s. In Atlantic Canada 
the opposite scenario holds. The dominance of the service 
sector in Atlantic Canada reflects both dependence on 
government and the simple fact that the manufacturing sector 
is comparatively small.
The industrial structures of the Atlantic region and 
New England are very different, reflecting both historic and 
recent developments. Only by isolating the three more 
Northerly states of the New England region can some 
parallels be drawn. The validity of this approach will be 
discussed in a later section.
Regional Growth Patterns
Many indicators can be used to measure growth and 
economic progress. For the purpose of this study, four are 
particularly useful : population, employment, unemployment 
and earned income.
NfiW England and Atlantic Canada have been experiencing 
a decline in their share of respective national populations 
for many years. This decline has been relatively constant
16
over the past thirty years, as shown In Table 2, and is 
partly a result of emigration to other regions of Canada and 
the United States.
Outmigration in New England can be related to serious 
economic difficulties in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. 
Between 1968 and 1975, 250,000 jobs disappeared from the 
region’s manufacturing sector. Many of the region's 
traditional industrial plants specializing 5n textiles, 
leather, and so on moved to areas where labour was cheaper, 
often to the South. In many cases workers followed. This 
pattern, combined with very low birth rates in the New 
England states make it the slowest growing region in the 
United States[19]. Slow growth is also evident in Atlantic 
Canada. Interprovincial migration, mostly to Ontario, has 
kept the population growth in the region growing slowly, and 
in some cases deolining[20].
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Table 2 
Growth of Population 
Atlantic Provinces and New England 
(1950/51 - 1980/81)(000)
1951 1961 1971 1981
361 458 522 562
98 105 112 121
843 738 789 838
516 598 635 689
1,618 1,898 2,057 2,210
14,009 18,238 21,568 24,343
11.6 10.4 9.5 9.1
914 969 994 1,125
533 607 738 921
378 390 445 511
4,691 5,149 5,689 5,737
792 859 949 947
2,007 2,535 3,032 3,108
9,314 10,509 11,847 12,348
151,326 179,311 203,302 226,505
6.2 5.9 5.8 5.5
Newfoundland:















New England as a 
% of the United States
Source: Statistics Canada; U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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There have been distinctly different growth patterns 
within New England in recent years. During the period 1969 
to 1983, northern New England had much higher growth In 
population than the three states to the south. This trend Is 
demonstrated in Table 3. Migration patterns (reviewed in 
detail in appendix C) show a pattern of migration from the 
southern part of the region to the north. Projections show 
that New Hampshire will grow much faster than the regional 
or national average from 1980 to 2000[21].
Table 4 shows long-term and short-term national and 
regional employment growth rates. During the period 1969 to 
1983, Canada outperformed the United States, New England, 
and the Atlantic region. The Atlantic Region, while below 
the Canadian average, bettered the New England rate of job 
creation. New England fell behind the U.S. average during 
the long term time frame, but has performed better in recent 
years. Northern New England's record of job creation was 
the best measured.
New England has outperformed both Canada and the 
United States in recent years. Atlantic Canada has 
continued to perform badly in this regard. Labour force 
growth has in fact been much more rapid than job creation in 
the Atlantic region leading to dramatic increases in 
unemployment rates[22j. Atlantic Canada's continuing high 
unemployment rate reflects dependence on resource-based 
activities and continuing venerability to business cycle 
fluctuation. Some economic theoristsf23] would maintain 









Atlantic Provinces 11.8 2.2
United States 16.2 4.2
New England 3.4 1.2
Northern New England 22.2 3.4


















Source: Statistics Canada ; U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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adjustment in the Atlantic region due to the inhibiting 
Influence of a variety of federal transfers such as 
unemployment insurance and government to government 
payments. Others[24] would maintain that the unemployed 
represent a pool to be drawn upon when the dominant regions 
of the country have labour shortages.
The opposite is true of New England. Employment 
growth has outstripped labour force growth, leading to 
extremely low unemployment rates despite the highest 
participation rates in the United States. The increased pace 
of employment growth during the 1980’s in New England 
reflects the winding down of the rationalisation and 
adjustment in the manufacturing sector, and rapid growth in 
new high technology manufacturing along with steady 
expansion in the non-government portion of the service 
sector.
Table 6 shows that over the period 1969 to 1983, earned 
income per person in Atlantic Canada increased at a rate 
slightly more than the Canadian average. In recent years, 
however, this pace has slowed. In 1983 per capita earned 
income In the Atlantic provinces was still just over 70 
percent of the national level.
By contrast, during both the long and short-term 
periods, incomes in New England continue to grow more 
rapidly than the U.S. average despite starting from an 
already impressive base[25]. Reasons for better incomes in 
New England are difficult to trace. Theories of regional 








Canada 6.9 7.4 11.9
Atlantic Provinces 9.8 11.7 15.0
United States 8.5 5.8 9.6
New England 10.4 5.5 6.9
Northern New England 9.7 5.3 7.3
Source: Statistics Canada; U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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Table 6
Earned Income Per Person 
And Growth Rates 
Atlantic Provinces and New England 
(1969-1983)







Canada 100.0 100.0 10.5 9.2
Atlantic
Provinces 66.9 70.7 11.0 9.0
U.S.A. 100.0 100.0 7.6 5.9
New England 104.5 110.8 8.0 8.6
Northern 
New England 84.0 88.3 7.9 8.1
Source: Statistics Canada; 0 .S . Bureau of the Census.
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a commercial and manufacturing base and significant 
agglomeration economies, including close proximity to 
markets. More recently growth has been related to 
innovation in the manufacturing sector and related service 
sector employment.
Northern New England
There is a popular view that northern New England is 
particularly similar to Atlantic Canada[26]. While this may 
be true at some levels, many features of the two regions are 
quite different. In addition to the obvious political 
differences, there is a sharp contrast in recent economic 
performance.
The population of the three northern states, 
approximately 2.5 million, is similar to that of Atlantic 
Canada. Population densities are also comparable. Income 
per person in Maine and Vermont are below the U.S. average, 
although not to the extent that those of Atlantic Canada lag 
the Canadian average. In economic terms, northern New 
England is more resource based, although it is not as 
dependent on resources as Atlantic Canada.
Differences between the two regions are often stark. 
While New England as a whole has grown faster than the rest 
of the United States, Canada, and the Atlantic region, 
northern New England has performed even better. Northern
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New England has exceeded the rest of New England’s 
performance in employment growth while experiencing a 
greater population growth. The top three states have 
reduced disparities in income per person and are now at 
about 90 percent of the O.S. level. Improvements in 
Atlantic Canada have been much more limited.
Several factors favour Northern New England. The area 
is close to the most heavily populated part of both Canada 
and the United States. New Hampshire, in particular, has 
benefited from the 'spill over’ effect of bordering on 
Massachusetts, the most dynamic of the New England states. 
This spill over seems to relate to quality of life as much 
as business concerns such as tax advantages and industrial 
Infrastructure
Manufacturing employment in New England as a proportion 
of total employment is about the same in both areas of the 
region, about 26 percent in mid-1987[27]. Manufacturing 
employment in Atlantic Canada’s was about 13 percent around 
the same time[28]. While the northern three states have 
been more resource dependent than the New England Average, 
they also have a good mix of high technology industries.
Northern New England states have lower corporate taxes 
than their southern counterparts, although the general tax 
burden (corporate, personal and sales taxes) is comparable 
or higher than many other states In the U.S. These 
relationships are shown in table 7. Low personal tax rates 
in New Hampshire, together with its proximity to
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Massachusetts, is a big factor in its growth[29]. Lower 
taxes may be a factor in relocation of firms and individuals 
within New England.
There is little advantage in limiting this analysis to 
a comparison of the Atlantic region to the three northern 
New England states. Such an analysis would tend to minimize 
the substantial impact the other three states have on the 
region as a whole.
Conclusion
Even a cursory overview points to significant 
differences between New England and the Atlantic provinces. 
Larger population and population densities together with 
very different industrial structures do not make for a solid 
base for comparison of growth patterns. The northern New 
England states, while more similar to their Maritime 
neighbours, can not be treated In isolation from their 
prosperous relatives to the south.
Some similarity in historical development is evident. 
However while traditional sectors of the Now England economy 
were fading, other sectors, principally the high tociinology
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Table 7
New England State Business Tax Burdens 
(percent of net business Income going to taxes)
(1977)
State Tax Burden U.S. Rank
Massachusetts 11.2 4
Rhode Island 11.0 5
Connecticut 10.7 6
Vermont 9.8 10
New Hampshire 9.4 11
Maine 9.1 13
Source: New England Council Inc.
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sector, were growing rapidly. While New England has had its 
ups and downs it has never been considered a peripheral 
economy. The Atlantic region on the other hand 
deindustrialised to a degree In the early 1900*s, leaving 
an Industrial structure based for the moat part on 
Indigenous resources or local markets.
While the two regions are obviously very different, 
attempts at comparisons persist. This situation Is not 
unique. Delegations of politicians and policy makers from 
around the world have come to New England to draw lessons 
from the New England miracle. Most Jurisdictions have a 
battery of "high tech" policies and programs in place. New 
Englanders, ranging from management consultants to 
presidential hopefuls, have fanned out across the U.S. and 
around the world to spread the word. The purpose of this 
discussion is to explore New England’s growth in theoretical 
and empirical terms and determine if, in fact, comparisons 
can be made and lessons can be learned.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORIES OF REGIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
Introduction 
What la a Region?
A logical starting point is to define the meaning of a 
region in the sense it will be used in this dissertation.
No clear cut definition is available, however. A region can 
be defined in theoretical, social, policy or spatial terms 
and meanings can change over time. International theories 
of growth, development and underdevelopment are often used 
with little adjustment to explain sub-national observations 
and expectations. Class analysis has been used from time to 
time to describe regional relationships.
The notion of a region is probably most dynamic when 
defined in policy terms[l]. Early Canadian regional 
development policies focussed on rural areas. Later, with 
the birth of the Department of Regional Economic 
Kxpansion(DREE), regional policy reflected disparities 
between the Atlantic region (including part of Quebec) and 
the rest of the country. As the application of regional 
policy expanded over the years the meaning of the term 
‘region' became blurred. Regional policy grew to encompass 
the whole country. What was once clearly definable as a 
regional policy had become a Canada-wide development 
policy. The term region became a word designed to calm
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local aensibllities and policy applications became ao broad 
that it included every part of the country from the Hn^ftown 
to Happy Valley.
Various authors have at some length defined ooncoi»ta of 
regional development[2], community development[3], and local 
development[4]. For the purposes of this paper It is useful 
to set semantics aside and define the regions of concern as 
the Atlantic region of Canada and the New England region of 
the United States. This determination is largely one of 
convention, where adjacent political jurisdictions with some 
similarities, however tenuous, tend to be grouped together. 
With a spatial reference point established we next look to 
theoretical underpinnings of regional growth and 
development.
Regional Growth Theory 
There have been three main influences on regional 
theory and policy[5]: neo-classical theoryl6j, Keynesian
theory[7], and Marxist theory[8]. While none of these three 
can be accurately defined as a theory of regional growth as 
such, all have made vital contributions to the development
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of various models. In a manner of speaking, these basic 
paradigms are the parentheses which bound the various 
theories that will be explored.
Neo-classical and Keynesian theory combined with some 
observations on the workings of underdeveloped economies 
form the underpinnings of most orthodox theories of regional 
growth. Most orthodox theories show an inherent belief, in 
the primacy of the market in economic matters along with an 
occasional Keynesian predisposition towards government 
intervention in the economy.
A second category of models of regional disparity can 
be termed "non-traditional" and represent the application 
of a wide range of theory combined with broad application of 
historical observation and evidence. The influence of 
Keynesian thinking is quite strong among thinkers in this 
group. Neo-classical economics plays a lesser role. This 
Is a rather diverse category with some models reflecting 
rather unique perception on regional problems.
The third theoretical grouping includes radical regional 
theories and reflects the dominant influence of Marxist 
theory combined with historical evidence on the nature of 
growth and underdevelopment. This particular category is 
the newest and perhaps the least developed of the three main 
streams. A dominant paradigm has yet to emerge from this 
third group and policy applications have been very limited 
as of yet.
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These three streams, reflecting a variety of models of 
regional growth, have explained the process of growth and 
development with varying degrees of success over the years. 
The experience of the Atlantic region to date seems to 
suggest that policies, based to some extent on known 
paradigms, have been less than effective. It is not 
surprising that theories which leave something to be desired 
in their explanations of regional growth should give poor 
results when they form the basis of policy. One suspects 
that the solution to regional problems may still be looked 
within the maze of models and paradigms that have 
accumulated over the years. The right policy or the right 
combination of theoretical explanations have not yet boon 
found In the case of Atlantic Canada. New England’s 
success, on the other hand, can be explained by reference to 
a limited number of interdependent factors which are 
consistent with a range of theoretical perspectives. In the 
case of Atlantic Canada, regional growth theory is most 
apparent in various policy applications. A review of 
regional growth theory in the context of the "New England 
miracle" and a lack of success of regional policy in 
Atlantic Canada should prove valuable.
Theoretical Parameters 
General Equilibrium 
Neo-classical economics is characterized by a faith in
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the market and its ability to distribute resources in 
society in an equitable and optimum fashion. In reference 
to a particular region this theory would highlight 
comparative advantages of some regions over others while 
attributing problems of high unemployment and so on to 
market imperfections. In fact the absence of equilibrium 
state "full employment" is often attributed to barriers to 
the proper functioning of the market.
The neo-classical approach is not a theory of regional 
disparities and regional growth as such:
The neo-classical approach maintains that several 
standard methods of economic analysis can be used to 
advantage in discussing regional problems. It 
emphasises the importance of flexibility in wages and 
prices, the mobility of labour and capital, and the 
capacity of market forces to solve regional problems 
when they are allowed to work unhindered[9].
While neo-classical theory appears to have a considerable 
influence on most orthodox models, there is no evidence of a 
whole-hearted application of pure neo-classical principles. 
Policy has been tempered with Keynesian and political 
concerns for the most part.
The currency of neo-classical theory among Canadian 
policy makers has been quite high at times over the last 
thirty years. In the years before 1960 laissez faire 
economics played an important role. As commitment to the 
regional development policies of the early 1960's waned, The 
Economic Council of Canada in its fifth Annual Review!10J
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embraced the popular American version of the neo-claasloal 
paradigm[ll]. This version emphasised the role of 
unrestricted markets, private enterprise and free trade[l2).
More recently, with the demise of DREE and the 
uncertainty over the effectiveness of regional development 
policies, neo-classical theory has again gained popularity. 
One author writing in this vein has been Tom Courchene[I31 
who sees most federal transfers causing not only market 
disruption but debilitating dependence in recipient 
regions[14].
Neo-classical theory is accused of a variety of 
weaknesses including limitations in its dealings with social 
relationships and spatial factors. The main limitation of 
the model are problems in dealing with technical 
change[15]. This is an important consideration In dealing 
with the New England Economy. Technology is explained in 
theory through the use of a neo-classical production 
function, Y=F(K,L,R,t), where output is a function of 
capital, labour, land, and "t" represents a trend factor 
representing constant technological improvement[16|, 
Unfortunately, empirical testing shows that much of growth 
must be attributed to this mysterious "t" term Attempts to 
define it more closely within the limits of theory have boon 
largely unsuccessful.
Following upon the discovery that there was a largo 
"residual" involved in neo classical explanations of 
economic growth, and the identification of that 
residual with technical change, economists undertook a
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considerable amount of research aimed toward pinning 
down what technical change actually Is... But what we 
now know about technical change should not be 
comforting to an economist who has been holding the 
hypothesis that technical change can be easily 
accommodated within an augmented neo-classical model. 
Nor can the problem here be brushed aside as Involving 
a phenomenon that is small relative to those that are 
well handled by the theory; rather it relates to a 
phenomenon [that is, technical change] that all 
analysts (or virtually all) acknowledge as the central 
one in economic growth. The tail now wags the dog and 
the dog does not fit the tail very well. The 
neo-classical approach to growth theory has taken us 
down a smooth road to a dead end[17].
Despite its clear limitations neo-classical theory has 
a dominant influence among today’s policy makers. This is 
clear from the growing focus on the national as opposed to 
local issues and a growing impatience among policy makers 
with things regional. However, in some circles and among 
some authors[18] the inability of the model to explain 
changing technology, perhaps the dominant force in recent 
growth, has led to a search for alternatives.
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Keynes
In contrast to the neo-classical brand, Keynesian 
theory maintains that the market does not guarantee full 
employment. Economies are subject to cyclical downturns and 
government intervention to stimulate aggregate demand is 
often necessary to reach full employment[19]. Indeed, 
Keynesian theory recognises that demand can be 
geographically dispersed and thus differences in 
unemployment rates among regions can exist[20].
Keynesian theory is Imperfect in regard to its concepts 
of region, however. It does not recognize certain Important 
spatial aspects of a regional economy (distance to 
markets). Keynesian policies useful at the national level 
(exchange rate manipulation) are not practical for regions 
within a country.
Keynesian economists Roy Harrod and Evsey Domar saw savings 
and investment as the central forces behind growth[21J. Lack 
of growth was therefore related to a shortage of capital. 
Others, such as Kaldor, arrived at the same conclusion via a 
different route[22]. Kaldor viewed money supply as 
endogenous at national and sub-national levels. Banks are 
prepared to supply credit indefinitely at set interest 
rates. Level of investment depends on the quality and number 
of investment opportunities. Dependency theorists in 
particular have taken exception to the assumption of equal 
treatment of regions by banks.
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Deaplte these drawbacks, Keynesian theory has had a 
major impact since World War II. Most recently, Reaganomics 
has stimulated aggregate demand through tax cuts and 
increased government spending all under the guise of 
restraint in government. New England in particular has 
benefited from this policy in the form of a dramatic upswing 
in military procurement since 1980.
For a good part of the post-war period, economic policy 
makers in Canada were content to guide the national economy 
solely with the aid of Keynesian stabilization policy and to 
leave regions to the workings of regional comparative 
advantage and structural adjustments to the free market[23]. 
Little thought was given to the regional impacts of these 
expansionary national policies. This trickle down 
philosophy was clear from the time of the 1945 White Paper 
on Employment and Income[24], the first attempt in Canada to 
formulate policy from Keynesian theory. One critical 
element was missing however:
"This was the conception common to Keynes’ thought 
that high levels of income and employment in the 
national economy could not be relied upon to solve the 
problems of economically retarded regions, that demand 
management policies should be supplemented by special 
policies to promote regional balance in employment and 
Income."[25].
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The trickle down approach was long considered the main 
source of regional growth. It was not until the regional 
science model of economic growth became popular that this 
more subtle interpretation of Keynes found Its way into 
policy.
Marx
The Marxist approach is essentially a historical one.
It focuses on determining how an economy works by 
interpreting observable social and economic Interaction.
The workings of the economy are explained in terms of 
productive relationships, specifically the interaction of 
"forces of production"[26]. The forces of production include 
such things as machines, raw materials and workers, while 
the relations of production are relations between human 
beings. The two together are a mode of production. Forces 
of production are constantly changing (new technology etc.) 
while relations of production are constantly adjusting to 
changing ’forces’. With winners and losers in this 
adjustment process it is inevitable, in a Marxist analysis, 
that class conflict and disparities in accumulated wealth 
and power develop.
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This natural state of conflict and exploitation between 
rich and poor found applications in the international 
literature on the cause of underdevelopment in Latin 
America. This model of economic development (more aptly 
termed a model of underdevelopment) focuses on the 
exploitative relationship between highly developed 
capitalist countries and less developed ones. Monopolistic 
powers are deployed in a fashion such that the resources of 
the periphery are drawn from it for the use of the core, 
with little or no benefit to the supplying area. In effect 
the periphery is exploited in a fashion that leads to 
underdevelopment. A variety of authors have attempted to 
adapt this international theory to regional problems 
(Veltmeyer, Sacouman, Archibald). Ralph Matthews, feels 
that Marxist analysis "provides one of the most 
comprehensive and systematic analyses of the nature and 
causes of regional differences available in economic 
literature" [27]. As evidence of this capability, Matthews 
states that "regional divisions and disparities are 
Inseparable from the class divisions within a society and 
are explainable in class terms"[28].
Regional disparities in growth are, in this view, a 
natural and endemic characteristic of capitalism and can be 
directly related to the goal of accumulating wealth. Health 
is distributed unequally among classes. The role of a 
peripheral region is as a supplier of resources, capital and 
labour. High unemployment in the exploited region 
represents a large reserve army of labour that can be drawn
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upon at low cost when needed in the dominant area. A 
Marxist perspective on regional disparities would also focus 
on the presence of a regional government stripped of funds 
through infrastructure commitments. These funds could have 
been used to stimulate indigenous growth.
The usefulness of Marxist analysis in explanation of 
regional disparities is in its understanding of power 
relationships (the dominance of the center over the 
periphery) and its integration of economic considerations 
with social ones through an exploration of class structure. 
The main weakness of Marxist analysis is in its lack of 
focus on spatial relations. It shares this fault with the 
other streams of economic analysis. In addition, conflict 
exists within the radical camp between those of the 
dependency school who have rejected growth as a possibility 
despite empirical evidence to the contrary, and more 
traditional Marxist views that capitalist growth must take 
place and is one stage in the drive to communism. Attempts 
to rationalise this conflict have bred a whole range of 
neo-Marxian paradigms.
One of the main attempts to rationalize this conflict 
is the notion of dependent capitalist development, 
popularized by Cardoso[29], that growth and develop» snt 
could take place in and underdeveloped country(region). 
Veltmeyer sees the multi national corporation as the main 
instrument of this growth, which remains ultimately 
exploitive and dependent on outside expertise and 
technology[30].
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Policy prescriptions arising out of Marxist analysis 
have gone untested in this country. However in a Marxist 
analysis, underdeveloiwient and disparities are a natural 
process only to be overcome by class struggle and 
revolution. Obviously this stream of thought does not lend 
itself to economic tinkering.
Orthodox Explanations of Regional Growth 
Introduction
The spectrum of economic development/underdevelopment 
theory does not lend itself naturally to regional 
formulations. Applications of broad theory to regional 
problems have tended to view the regions as a smaller 
version of the greater whole. This may explain to some 
extent the lack of success at applying broad theory to 
regional problems.
Regional development theories draw inspiration from 
many sources. Some writers trace regional perspectives in 
development as far back as late nineteenth century anarchist 
theorists[31]. A uniquely Canadian perspective on 
development was provided by a series of “staples theorists' 
including Innis[32] and MacKlntosh [33].
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The staples theory likely contributed to North's 
development of the export base model of growth[34]. The 
dominant International paradigm of growth and development, 
the developmental or modernisation approach, provides 
another perspective on regional growth and has had a major 
impact on regional policies[35]. Aspects of many of the 
above can be found In the so called regional science 
approach[36] which has been the backbone of regional policy, 
In Canada at least, since the early 1960's. A 
reinterpretation of existing theory along with some policy 
feedback has led to the development of the transfer 
dependency approach which is quickly becoming the dominant 
paradime at present. One view, the systemic approach, has 
grown from empirical investigations of the growth process 
rather than from the confines of existing theory.
Staples
The staples approach is an indigenous Canadian theory 
of economic growth and development centered around the work 
of Harold Innls [37]. Innis felt that the economic growth 
of a country or region was determined by the characteristics 
of its staple products; minerals, lumber, furs and so on. 
Under this theory, continued growth depends on the export of 
a succession of staple products. Shift.s in prominence from 
one staple to another results in periods of crisis and
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djsrupfciori. Undor optimum conditions staple exports could 
eventually lead to more diversified activities 
(manufacturing and services) through ‘spread effects’.
A more optimistic and highly influential version of the 
Staples theory was developed by W.A. KacKintosh. MacKintosh
argued that demand for resource generated economic growth
through the development of economic linkages. These were of 
three types: backward linkages, or the production of goods 
for staple industries; forward linkages, or the processing 
of resources ; and final demand linkages, or the production 
of consumer goods required by workers in the staple 
industry. MacKintosh offered no explanation however of 
underdeveloped economies where linkages failed to develop, 
as was the case in the Atlantic Region and, in a broader
sense, for Canada as a whole.
A rediscovery and reinterpretation of Innis’ work by 
certain economists working in the 1960’s (Watkins[38] for 
example) shed some light on the lack of development of 
economic linkages observed in Canada. Linkages faj.led to 
develop mainly because of the dominance of the imperial 
core, the United States or Britain, which set the terms of 
trade and captured most of the economic rent associated with 
staple developmont[39]. In other words, the core area draws 
off not only resources for further processing but most of 
the profits as well. Under this scenario Innls observed 
that governments were forced to commit funds to
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infrastructure construction for the support of staple 
exports with a significant cost to the country in terms of 
misdirected funds.
Innis’ contribution can be summarized:
Canadian development theory, in the hands of Innis, 
emphasized factors such as discrepancies in power 
between metropolis and hinterland, the consequences of 
external control, the problem of leakages of capital, 
institutional blockages to economic diversification, 
and the frequent occurrence of disequilibrium and 
crisis, ideas which did not gain currency in 
international circles until the 1970’sL40].
Direct policy application of staples theory have been 
limited. Policy, where it has developed, has reflected the 
split in interpretation of the staples thesis. Policies 
reflecting the earlier Interpretation of Innis by authors 
such as MacKintosh focusing on the development of economic 
linkages through the subsidization of manufacturing 
industries have been popular, although unsuccessful, in 
Atlantic Canada. On the other hand, strong inter industry 
linkages have developed in New England with no overt 
subsidization. However, it has been maintained by some that 
U.S. subsidies to industry are present but less easily 
identifiedL[40].
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Export/Economic Base Approach 
The staple theory, at least MacKintosh’s version of it, 
seems to have been a significant influence in the 
development of an export based theory of growth by an 
American Economist, Douglas North[41]. North saw external 
demand for staples generating a domestic surplus which would 
create demand for import substitution through a natural 
process. North reflected MacKintosh's optimism in the 
belief that linkages to the manufacturing and service 
sectors would develop as a matter of course.
The Developmental Approach/Modernisation Theory 
This approach has had its greatest application in the 
international setting but certain aspects of it have been 
influential in the context of regional growth. This theory 
has its origins in the writings of Lewis[42] and Rostow[43| 
who saw both development and underdevelopment merely as 
stages through which all economies passed. This notion has 
its equivalent in orthodox Marxism. Rostow's "stages 
theory" included five stages : the traditional or subsistence 
society, the preconditions or staples stage, the take off or
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embryonic manufacturing stage, the drive to maturity stage 
and finally an age of mass consumption which was dominated 
by service Industries[441.
In this scenario underdevelopment was caused by the 
lack of certain ingredients necessary to move on to the next 
stage. Key among these were; lack of accumulation of the 
physical capital required for investment, the lack of social 
capital or infrastructure (schools, highways etc.) needed as 
a base for economic growth, and lack of the human capital 
(skills and training) needed to run an economy at high 
levels of productivity. In this sense, this view is 
consistent with other orthodox paradigms which see 
underdevelopment as simply a lack of growth due to the 
absence of one or more of its key ingredients.
Wliile the modernisation doctrine has had a fair amount 
of application on an international and regional basis, the 
theory Itself is flawed. The stages theory is not supported 
by empirical evidence. Stages are not as distinct, nor are 
they the same in every country. Underdeveloped countries 
tend to be regarded as a clean slate, when in reality they 
are often a mix of development and underdevelopment. There 
is little focus on transition mechanisms between stages 
Insufficient attention is paid to resource endowment, 
economic history and competition from the outside world.
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Despite these problems, the developmental approach has 
been used widely, mostly in the international context, but 
also in the regional development field. Regional policies 
focussing on infrastructure and education are grounded, at 
least in part, on this international paradime.
Regional Science Approach 
Introduction
The regional science approach, rather than being a pure 
theory of economic development, is a combination of a 
variety of approaches. It melds many of the notions of 
neo-classical economics adjusted through observation and 
practice. Its primary focus is on the spatial dimension of 
economic growth (distance from markets, transportation 
costs, etc.) combined with an appreciation of the influence 
economic structure has on the locational decision and the 
ultimate success of firms. Regional science goes beyond the 
pure neo-classical approach which gives little weight to 
spatial and structural factors[45].
Walter Isard, in the Introduction to his landmark 
voJ\me "Introduction to Regional Science", lists thirteen 
definitions of regional science. It is useful to restate a 
few:
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-Regional science is the comprehensive study of a 
meaningful region or system of regions in all its key 
economic, political, social, cultural, and 
psychological aspects.
-Regional science aims to identify and expose simple, 
basic principles of spatial organization —  principles 
that govern equilibrium and organizational structure 
and relate to efficiency, equity, and social welfare.
-Regional science is the study of the joint 
interaction of social, political, and economic 
behaving units and the physical environment within 
meaningful regions and systems of regions[46|.
Regional science encompasses a number of paradigms that 
explain growth. It is useful, in a review such as this, to 
touch on some of them here.
Central Place 
This t ry of regional growth was first proposed 
by Lo.sch[471 in the early I960’s. It recognizes that certain 
economies are gained from location in a central area. Where 
consumer demand is evenly spread, overlapping marketing 
areas minimize transportation costs thus improve competition 
of firms located in that central area. Walter lsardl48|, 
probably the dominant figure in regional science, built on 




Porroux[49] pioneered the orthodox notion of polarized 
development. This French economist noted that growth does 
not occur naturally but at poles of growth with variable 
intensity. The key ingredient in this process are 
propulsive or motor industries which pull other industries 
along through a variety of linkages. Perroux’s observations 
on the nature of growth came with built-in policy 
Implications. Perroux felt that if the mechanisms of 
regional growth could be understood it could be copied and 
applied to depressed areas.
Agglomeration Economies 
The notion of agglomeration and deglomeration economies 
relates to the fact that there are certain economies and 
diseconomies related to regional concentrations of 
population and/or industry. Isard divides these into three 
separate categories, scale economies, localization 
economies, and urbanization economies.
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Scale economies refer to the notion of increasing 
returns to scale. The larger a facility the more broadly it 
is able to spread its fixed cost among units of production. 
Large scale production requires a large market (a large 
population nearby). Recent technological advances in the 
area of automated manufacturing have made shorter and more 
diverse production runs increasingly viable. A plant no 
longer has to be retooled, just reprogrammed. This advance 
has led to some rethinking of traditional notions of scale.
Localization economies relate to the economies derived 
by a firm which locates in the middle of an industrial 
complex, close to intermediate buyers, suppliers, repair 
facilities, and so on. This is why firms tend to locate in 
industrial parks and why new high tech computer firms in New 
England tend to locate in close proximity to established New 
England high tech firms. Route 126 was not, it appears, an 
accident.
Urbanization economies take the principles of 
localization economies a step further. The existence of an 
industrial urban complex means not only Industrial linkage 
but guarantees pools of trained labour and the necessary 
management design and research and development skills are 
more likely to exist. Again this pattern is most evident in 
New England.
There are also diseconomies associated with increasing 
size. Traffic congestion, high crime rates, and a general 
social anxiety are the price of growth and must be weighed 
against the benefits of agglomeration economies. Changing
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communications technology combined with the growing 
importance of the service sector, have seen individual 
choices about quality of life increasingly overwhelm the 
agglomeration benefits of a central or an urban 
location.
Transfer Dependency 
While neo-classical theory has been a major influence 
on almost all national and regional policies in Canada and 
the United States, its preoccupation with a free functioning 
market has often been tempered by other theoretical and 
various political concerns. Explanations of regional 
problems based neo-classical economics continue to have a 
major influence.
One uniquely Canadian interpretation of this 
perspective is the notion of "transfer dependency" 
popularized by Courchene[50]. In this model, government 
regulatory programs and social assistance policies as 
applied to depressed areas prevent markets from working and 
thus perpetuate and even worsen regional disparity.
Under this scenario federal transfers of various kinds 
make the provinces more dependent, a dependence which 
manifests itself not only at the level of government but 
also culturally and socially. The end result is widespread 
economic dependence and a general feeling of hopelessness 
among dependent individuals. It is interesting to note that
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ultimate dependence on regional programs is also the end 
result of the less orthodox cumulative causation process 
which will be discussed later[51].
Transfer dependency is in sharp contrast to the 
neo-classical perspective outlined by the Economic Council 
of Canada in "Living Together"tS2] which saw the largest 
transfer programs, equalization and so on, as a means to use 
the market system to solve regional problems by first 
eliminating more obvious Inequalities. Courchene’s version 
of sees policies such as equalization as part of the 
problem, not as part of the solution.
Policy options evolving from the transfer dependency 
approach involve the removal of social support mechanisms so 
that natural adjustment mechanisms (the market system) can 
be allowed to function. In this scenario high minimum wages, 
generous unemployment Insurance and other support mechanisms 
are the enemies of regional adjustment. These and like 
sentiments seem to be a guiding force of recent policy 
trends in Canada. A perceived need to reduce deficits have 
led governments to look seriously at the convenient notion 
of transfer dependency. In this respect, New England can be 
pointed to as an area where barriers to the proper 
functioning of the market are few and adjustment is an 
important part of resurgent growth.
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Non-traditlonal Growth Theories 
Cumulative Causation
This conception regional differences was espoused by G. 
Myrdal[53] in the late 1950*3. This model is opposed to the 
neo-classical notion that regional problems can be solved if 
the market is allowed to move towards its natural 
equilibrium.
In an economy governed by market forces, if enough 
people leave an area, productivity there will increase. The 
cumulative causation model on the other hand sees emigration 
as a primary cause of decline. The most highly prized 
skills of a depressed area are the most mobile.
Out migration causes markets to shrink and fixed costs for 
government, health care and so on, to weigh heavily on those 
remaining.
Policies reflecting aspects of this model were popular 
in the mid to late 1960*s in Canada. The Atlantic Provinces 
Economic Council was a strong advocate of various policies, 
manufacturing subsidies and so on, that had the potential of 
stemming the tide of migration during this period.
New England, suffering from a decline in traditional 
industries during the sixties and seventies, adopted no such 
policies. Emigration from the more populous Now England 
states, is a primary reason for today’s low unemployment 
rates. Despite this outflow, skills necessary for the high 
technology boom of the 1980*s were available and cheap when 




Friedmann, in hia General Theory of Polarized 
Development[54], like Myrdal, oversteps traditional 
orthodoxy. Unlike other regional scientists of the late 
1960’s, but surprisingly similar to Innis, he explains 
economic growth as a historical process with all its 
political and social complexities. The main difference from 
orthodox analysts of economic development however was his 
recognition of the possibility of the concentration of the 
benefits of economic growth in a central area at the expense 
of peripheral areas. Peripheral areas would tend to be 
exploited by the core until political alienation brought 
change, violent or otherwise.
It has been maintained by some that Friedmann’s influence 
was less than it might have been because of the development 
of a competing and more radical version of the 
core periphery thesis at the same time by A.G.Frank and 
otherst55J.
The core-periphery model could have easily inspired 
decentralization policies of the Canadian government of the 
1970’s. The same logic may apply to the policy of geographic 
targeting promoted by Massachusetts Governor Dukakis, 
beginning in the mid 1970’s[56].
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Left Nationalist Position
Innis’ observations on the process of development in 
Canada were rediscovered and to some extent expanded by 
Watkins and others in the mid 1960’s[57]. In Watkins* 
hands, Innis’ work was shown to anticipate the 
core-periphery interpretation of Frank and Friedmann, all in 
a unique Canadian economic and political environment. Innis 
showed how staples production subordinated Canada to the 
interest of imperial nations which control the staples trade 
and the flow of capital. Governments meanwhile were forced 
to commit funds, which may have had better uses, for the 
construction of the infrastructure for staple export.
Canada was thus caught up in what was termed "a staples 
trap" which prevented the development beyond a rudimentary 
economy. Where Canada did develop beyond resource 
processing, industries were generally branch plants 
established to circumvent the Canadian tariff and dependent 
on foreign owners for technology.
Watkins’ policy solution involved reducing foreign 
control of staple Industries, stemming the outflow of 
capital, and directing these funds to the development of 
indigenous manufacturing. These ideas likely influenced the 
formation of the Foreign Investment Revenue Agency in the 
1970’s and the National Energy Plan of 1980. Similar 
concerns with foreign control of industries have surfaced 
more recently in the United States[58].
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Small Is Beautiful 
An alternative approach to problems of underdevelopment 
was popularized, but by no means invented, by K.F.
Schumacher in his 1974 volume[59]. In a viewpoint related 
to the developmental and modernists approaches of the 
1960’s, Schumacher attributes poverty in underdeveloped 
areas to non material factors such as deficiencies in 
education, organization and dlscipline[60]. In this 
scenario, development does not begin with the resource base 
but with people. Resources are likely to remain untapped 
and unproductive if deficiencies are not first corrected.
Policies for economic development in Schumacher’s view 
must be an evolutionary process rather than an act of 
creation. The process must he one of building from the 
bottom up through education and training rather than from 
the top down through the establishment of large "green 
field" industries.
In this bottom up approach Schumacher identifies four 
aspects of development[611 :
-creating work where people live,
-fixed capital must be cheap and amenable to wide 
distribution,
-production methods must be simple 
-products made from local materials 
The main differences between this approach and others is a 
shift from concentration on goods and output to a 
concentration on people and jobs.
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ThlH particular model of development was quite popular 
in the mid-1970’s both in Canada and the United States. 
Within Canada’s regional development policy framework this 
new paradime offered a welcome change in focus from the type 
of development projects that lent themselves to spectacular 
failure, to a concentration on smaller more localized 
developments[62J.
In the United States, community development 
corporations were the main outlet for this paradigm. In 
1957 58, there were almost 2,000 CDC’s in operation in the 
U.S.[831 Massachusetts has one of the strongest 
commitments to CDC’s in the United States, with substantial 
support in government, business and academic circles.
bchumpetcri an Approach 
Introduction
Schumpeter felt that the individual entrepreneur is the 
key to economic growth and development[64J. The role of the 
entrepreneur was innovation, the use of an invention or a 
new process in the creation of greater efficiency or a new 
product. Tho use of new technology by the entrepreneur was 
the key process in economic growth. While Schumpeter 
separated inventor and innovator, Kostow conceded that they 
could exist simultaneously in a given country[65|. Rostow 
fc1t that invention was no guarantee of innovation.
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Schumpeter distinguished between the entrepreneur and 
the manager, whose role was one of routine decision making 
not innovation. The entrepreneur would eventually bo 
supplanted by bureaucratized management isolated from the 
risks of decision making, not a healthy situation in 
Schumpeter’s view.
Since capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, 
tends to automatize progress, we conclude that it 
tends to make itself superfluous - - to break to pieces 
under the pressure of its own success. The perfectly 
bureaucratized giant industrial unit not only ousts 
the small or medium sized firm and expropriates its 
owners, but in the end it also ousts the entrepreneur 
and expropriates the bourgeoisie as a class which in 
the process stands to lose not only its income but 
also what is infinitely more Important, its 
function[66].
It appears from this that the early stages of innovation are 
the most productive and according to some historians of 
entrepreneurship, the time when local or regional priorities 
are most keenly felt.
In the early stages of development, entrepreneurs are 
community oriented • aware, that i s , only of their 
impact on local markets for labour and goods. hater 
they become conscious of their particu1ar industry an 
a whole, and interested in its technical progress, 
their share of output, their standing|6Y)
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Clearly the early years of the micro computer industry 
were times of rapid growth in New England. Much of this can 
be related directly to the processes of invention and 
innovation and the presence of entrepreneurship. A review 
of the comings and goings of industries in Atlantic Canada 
gives the feel that local entrepreneurs have the greatest 
commitment to the region[68]. A lack of entrepreneurial 
skills has been pointed to in various studies on the 
At!antic region as the main cause of 
underdoveiopmontl69J.
The Entrepreneurial Approach 
This approach, which A.M. Sinclair has labelled the 
'Schumpeter Hagan Entrepreneurial Input Approach*, r ' 'tes 
the Idea ti»at the key to economic growth is the development 
or importing of successful innovators[70]. In this model, 
the absence of successful entrepreneurs in a depressed 
rtîgion can not be attributed solely to the absence of 
comparative advantage or tho market imperfections 
highlighted in the neo-classical approach.
Rome, like Levine at the University of New Brunswick, 
have speculated that the environment in the Atlantic region, 
for cultural and other reasons, is opposed to change(71].
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This he maintains is not a good breeding ground for 
entrepreneurs. Now England, on the other hand, is, 
according to legend, the birthplace of Yankee ingenuity.
This combined with a high level of research and development 
and invention, fodder for the innovator, would explain in 
part the region’s recent success.
Neo-Schumpeterian Approach 
The neo Schumpeterian approach, according to Kransman, 
has arisen from a loss of faith in the descriptive and 
practical qualities of existing neo-classical and dependency 
theories[72j. This approach is concerned with the 'process’ 
of economic change rather than the analysis of equilibrium 
states. While its major theme is the role of technical 
change in growth, the key to growth remains the 
entrepreneur. No distinction is made in relative va Iue of 
public versus private sector Innovation. It is an 
interdisciplinary approach recognising interactions between 
all elements of society and interdependence of techno I of%y, 
economics, education, entrepreneurship, and politics!7%)
Availability of capital, as in most other paradigms we 
have reviewed, is an important factor. in particular, the 
availability of venture capital or pre venture capital is 
essential to successful innovation. Kducational 
institutions play a role in development beyond their 
standard training and knowledge accumulating functions.
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Universities roust, within this paradigm, be a source of 
useful research and development, consulting services, and 
innovation. In short they must become part of the rapidly 
growing knowledge industry.
Technology is regarded as important, but as a tool of 
development not as an end in itself. Governments around the 
world have developed a rich and very similar battery of 
policies essentially designed to do the same thing, promote 
high technology industries, microelectronics, biotechnology 
and so on. All of the above are maturing industries. This 
approach makes the sensible observation that governments can 
not pick winners. They can guide innovation through 
contracting procedures, procurement, providing a nutrient 
information flow, and providing social infrastructure. 
Unfortunately governments’ responce to the challenge of 
entrepreneurship has, at least in the Atlantic region, 
involved an array of programs administered by a variety of 
agencies which are often overlapping, counterproductive or 
overly complex. It would appear that if results are any 
measure, authorities in New England have done a better job.
Voluntaristic Development 
This approach to regional development refers to the 
approach to regional problems developed in various works by 
Ralph Matthew3[74,|. Matthews recognizes the validity of a 
Marxist type of analysis but also highlights what he feels
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are some clear limitations. Most dominant among these 
limitations Is the manner In which the new Canadian 
political economy has tended to Ignore tho Importance of 
traditional concerns such as the impact of social 
organisation and culture on economic development[75|
It is interesting to note that the notion of technological 
culture, the mixing of culture and enterprise endemic to a 
particular area, is an important concept within the 
neo“Schumpeterian approach.
Matthews’ approach departs from Canadian political 
economy in Its focus on basic values and attitudes, and 
places a premium on the power of the Individual to affect 
his or her own world. In this respect Matthews' approach 
rejects the Marxist notion that the individual is a captive 
of class.
The policy implications of this approach are likely 
similar to the Schumpeter view and consistent with the 
entrepreneurial mold. It does not appear that the currency 
of this approach has risen enough to warrant specific policy 
applications however. It does however provide a link 
between a variety of Important and seemingly diverse modern 
theories.
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Son of Dependency of Province Building Model 
In a study on self-sufficiency and regional dependency, 
it has been argued that the Nova Scotia economy, and by 
implication the Atlantic economy, is "on the periphery of 
the periphery"L76]. Nova Scotia, in other words, is a 
branch plant of the Ontario branch plant.
Borrowing from dependency theory this model describes 
factors which undermine the Atlantic economy such as the 
Canadian Tariff, central bureaucratic control and capital 
outflow. The solution proposed is a more autonomous and 
morn powerful, provincial government under the assumption 
ihai Individual provinces are in the best position to 
promote internal economic development.
Kvidcnce of the application of this model can be seen in 
the decentralization of government during the 1970’s. 
Interprovincial barriers to trade and competition among 
provinces and states for various industrial plants would 
also seem to be indicators of this theory in action. States 
rights have always been paramount to the American system of 
government. The states of New England wield more influence 
within their borders than do the provinces of Atlantic 
Canada.
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Radical Explanations of Growth and Underdevelopment 
Introduction
Like the previous grouping, ‘radical' paradigms of 
growth and underdevelopment reject the orthodox notion of 
the existence of a natural equilibrium. Most authors in this 
grouping have a Marxist orientation. The range of models 
proposed by writers In this vein are, nevertheless, quite 
broad. '
Dependency Theory: The International Debate 
Dependency theory, although often identified with the 
work of A.G.Frank [771 alone, is more accurately described 
as a wide range of positions articulated by a number of 
authors describing the inherently exploitive nature of a 
center/periphery economic system. This body of thought 
found its expression in the works of a some of Douth 
American economists and sociologists, the most well known 
being Frank. Blomstrom and Hettne saw the emergence of the 
dependency approach as the result of three factorst78|;
-The convergence of the neo-MarxianfTO] and what would 
become the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin AmericatBO](ECLA) Schools.
-Discussion among Latin American scholars on the 
reasons for underdevelopment.
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-The Latin American critique of modernization 
theory[81J.
While authors in the dependency tradition are quite 
varied in their approach, attempts have been made to 
categorize theoretical trends. Matthews identifies four 
stages in the dependency theory perspective[82].
-The acceptance of the exploitation inherent in a 
core/periphery relationship among countries.
The inevitable growth of a reserve army in an 
exploited region.
A focus on the social structure that both areas 
develop as a result regional dependency, and which 
In turn feeds regional dependency.
The fourth stage evaluates a shift from identifying 
links between developed and underdeveloped countries 
to a focus on the effects of dependency on social and 
economic structures.
Another author, H.Veltmeyer[83], has identified two 
basic formulations in dependency theory. The first, the 
Development of Underdevelopment, is identified with A.G. 
Frank. The second formulation has been called ‘‘dependent 
capitalist development", "associated dependent development", 
and the“new dependency theory" and has been identified with 
Fernando Cardoso[84|, Theotonio Dos Santos[83] and others.
The development of underdevelopment formulation is 
based on the notion that the dominant center drains capital 
from the exploited periphery, thus preventing the 
utilization of surplus labour for indigenous growth. In
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this respect, underdevelopment is a process as well as a 
state, and development is regarded as an Impossibility in 
the periphery region or county. This formulation is in 
direct conflict with the orthodox Marxist approach which 
sees capitalist development as the necessary forerunner to 
socialism.
The new dependency theory is an attempt to move further 
towards orthodox Marxism by recognizing that dependence and 
development are not contradictory notions. In this 
formulation multinational corporations and their control 
over technology are more important than appropriation of 
capital by the center. Class structures are a product of 
dependence and individuals are either compromised by the 
center or fragmented and powerless to resist.
Criticism of dependency theory has been well-rounded.
It has been criticized by neo-classical economists on the 
basis of comparisons with dependent but developed countries 
such as Canada and Belgiura[861. Orthodox Marxists 
identified similar faults and criticized dependency theory 
because of its lack of class analysis[87J.
Ernesto bauclau[88] saw the main flaw in dependency 
theory as its broad definition of Capitalism, bauclau saw 
capital transfer to the center area as a symptom and not a 
cause of underdevelopment. In Lauclau’s view the existence 
of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production and 
classes is a more reasonable explanation of 
underdevelopment. In this modes of production approach the
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rational for underdevelopment is more likely to be found in 
a class analysis than in relations between countries and 
regions.
Applications of dependency theory in its various forms 
have been limited and mostly unsuccessful[89]. While the 
theory appears to provide a reasonable explanation for 
underdevelopment it offers few paths out of it. It does 
provide an essential counter point to the perspectives 
already presented.
Regional Underdevelopment and Dependency 
The international dependency debate easily lends itself 
to an analysis of interactions of regions within a single 
country. Three uniquely Maritime explanations of the 
regional underdevelopment have arisen based on dependency 
theory[90]. These relate directly to the major areas of 
debate In the international literature, the development of 
underdevelopment, the new dependency approach and the modes 
of production approach.
A direct application of Frank’s theory of the 
development of underdevelopment was attempted by Bruce 
Archlbald[91]. This application was found wanting in its 
failure to deal with the many criticisms of Frank. The major 
problem with this formulating of the dependency thesis was a 
failure to account for the rapid industrialization of the 
Maritimes which occurred after 1B80[92].
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The remaining components of the dependency debate have 
been given a regional perspective by the so called "Maritime 
Marxists". The new dependency approach, of which Henry 
Veltmeyer Is a major Maritime proponent, focuses on the 
creation of an industrial reserve army in the region through 
the consolidation of capital at the centre[93]. This 
interpretation of the international now dependency thesis 
neatly accounts for the deindustrialisation of the Maritimes 
while simultaneously providing an explanation for certain 
class relations apparent in the Maritime region.
The modes of production approach, of which James 
Sacouman[94.1 is the major Maritime proponent is closely 
related to Lauclau’s treatment of the international 
dependency theory. Sanouman sees a variety of modes of 
production and related class structures as directly related 
to the uneven nature of capitalist development. Various 
social movements in the Maritimes are seen in this light as 
class reactions to underdevelopment.
The Maritime Marxists have come under broad criticism 
by more orthodox writers in the Marxist tradition [9b|.
This criticism relate to the argument made by various 
exponents of Maritime Marxism that the region’s 
underdevelopment is as much caused by certain structural 
limits to, and a form of, capitalist development specific to 
peripheral economies. This viewpoint provides some 
interesting insight on the New England Atlantic provinces
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comparison through its use of historical evidence and its 
long term prospective.
Conclusion
While the preceding theoretical review is broad, it is 
important in the context of this paper to provide a 
comprehensive review of the major viewpoints on the causes 
of economic growth. One of the key propositions in the 
analysis presented in this paper is that growth is a complex 
process and no one theory adequately deals with all its 
elements. Growth can however be described in terms of a 
variety of factors, each with their own theoretical 
grounding, working in unison to produce economic growth. A 
review of these factors as they come into play in New 
Kngland in the context of selected theoretical perspectives 
is tiic topic of the next chapter. It is hoped that from
l.his review of resurgent growt.h in New England some myths of 
comparai»! i i ty wi th Atlantic Canada will be exposed. It is 
also hoped I,hat this review will provide some lessons or at 
least a ix^ttor understanding of Atlantic Canada.
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REASONS FOR GROWTH 
Introduction
The reasons for economic growth, or a lack of it, are 
complex. Growth in the real world often defies description 
by any single theoretical perspective. In the previous 
section we reviewed a range of ideas on economic development 
and underdevelopment. In this section we will capture 
within these broad theoretical perspectives those factors 
which best describe the process of growth in New England.
Certain elements have been identified, through 
consensus, as the main contributing factors to Now England’s 
recent economic re.surgence. It is the position of this 
paper that it is not their existence which promotes growth, 
but their interaction and interdependence which contributes 
to the vibrance of New Engl and. These factors wi J1 he 
reviewed in some detail for both New England and Atlantic 
Canada. Thcvir existence or absence in Atlantic Canada would 
be relevant in determining if the factors which drove the 
New England ‘miracle’ can provide lessons for other 
jurisdictions.
While some aspects of New England’s rcsurgoncc fit 
neatly into the broad perspective of neo classical 
economics, this perspective does not deal with the key 
factors of economic growth at the micro level. Theories of 
regional science and the neo-Cchumpeterian view of the
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growth prooftas provide a better analysis at this level.
While much that has occurred in New England can be explained 
by the interaction of a variety of factors, theoretical 
perspectives provide additional explanatory detail and allow 
a degree of comparison between regions. However, some 
theories reviewed in the previous section are notable for 
their inability to account for the main factors of growth in 
cither region. In addition, no one theory is able to 
account for ail tbe main factors of growth in either region.
background to Growth in New England
The rebirth of the New England economy since 197b has 
been the subject of considerable economic research, both 
from inside and outside this region. Researchers and 
practitioners from a host of industrialised and emerging 
nations have traveled to New Kngland hoping for a model of 
growt-. that they could apply at home. What most found was 
tiiat the resurgence of the New England economy is based on 
t-he region’s capacity and ability to respond to growing 
worldwide demand for certain goods and services, 
spec!ficaIiy high tech manufactured goods and financial 
sc I'v i ces.
A variety of authors have Identified factors, some 
unique to New England, that account for the region's ability 
1.0 respond to a changing economic environmentt 1 ]. These 
include: the existing industrial base, defence spending on
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procurement and research and development, availability of 
appropriate forms of investment capital, the existence of 
top notch educational institutions, a consistently high 
level of research and development activity, an appropriate 
business environment, the existence of appropriate 
government policies and programs, and flexible labpur 
markets conducive to necessary adjustment in declining 
industries and the economy as a whole.
Observers point not only to the existence of these 
factors conducive to growth, but to their Interlinkage as 
the key to New England's growth. This growth is based 
directly on the region’s success in high technology 
manufacturing. This is in direct contrast to most national 
and regional patterns which show sharp declines in 
industrial employment and sharp gains in the service sector 
in a manner typical of most po.st-industrial societies.
This transformation of the manufacturing sector in New 
England was not easy. While the region possessed certain 
"natural" advantages, certain disadvantages had to be 
overcome. Until the mid-to-late 1970’s, the economy of New 
England was in serious difficulty. Its major Industries 
were in decline. So-called mature industries textiles, 
leather working, and so on - were facing severe competition 
from low wage competitors in the South and developing 
countries. Hundreds of thousands of job:; disappeared in a 
large scale structural adjustment which contrihuted to
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stagnant population and labour force growth. Between 1968 
and 1975, New England's manufacturing sector lost about a 
quarter of million joba[2].
The severity of these job losses was ameliorated 
somewhat by an expansion of defence related and high 
technology manufacturing during the Vietnam era, in the 
1960's. Military spending fell off in the early 1970’s with 
the end of the war and unemployment rates promptly reached 
double digit levels, higher than comparable figures in 
Atlantic Canada.
Prospects for the 1980's did not seem good. New 
England faced a number of disadvantages compared to other 
regions of the United States:
■ limited natural resources, 
inefficient transportation system.
- high energy costs.
industrial plant 35% older than the U.S. average, 
higher wages than many areas of the United States.
■ a heavier tax burden than some southern Stateol'SJ.
The region was not without its advantages however:
- a skilled labour force.
- manufacturing wages 10% below the U.S. average.
- a regional pool of professional venture capital, 
large pools of informal investors (old money).
a tradition of entrepreneurship and self reliance.
- an established defence industry infrastructure 
world class universities and technical schools.
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The recovery of the New England economy since the 
raid-1970’s suggests a picture of a high technology based 
economy able to minimize its disadvantages and maximize its 
advantages. Growth has been based on a strong high tech 
sector (figure 1) together with strong locally focused 
service sector growth (figure 2). Using the list of high 
technology industries listed In figure 1, the New Kngland 
Council Inc. found that the New Kngland states ranked at or 
near the top in terms of high technology employment growt.h 
as a percentage of total employment growth between 1975 and 
1982[41. Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshir«i,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maine ranked first, second, 
fourth, fifth, tenth and twelfth respectively.
A number of factors have contributed to the development 
of high technology industry in New Kngland, but their 
success at creating growth is quite likely the product of a 
unique set of historical ci rcums tances that brought -all 
factors into play in an i nterre I ated way at the most, 
opportune point of time.
Regional scientîo theory tells us that a .solid eeonf^m i r; 
base which provi de.s for agglomeration economics is vit,a I In 
growth, Early indur. I.r i a I iznti on in Now Knglarnl creat.ed a 
pool of skilled labour and on t repreneu rial ta I ont upon which 




Chemicals and Allied Products
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
Plastic Materials and Synthetics 
Drugs
Soaps and Cleaners 
Paints and Allied Products 
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 
Agricultural Chemicals 
Miscellaneous Chemical Products 
Petroleum Refining 
Fabricated Metal Products
Ordnance and Accessories 
Nonelectronic Machinery 
Engines and Turbines 
Nonelectronic Industrial Machinery 
Office, Computing and Accounting Machines 
Electronic Equipment
Electrical Transmission Equipment 
Electrical Industrial Apparatus 




Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery 
Transportation Equipment 
Aircraft and Parts 
Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles 
Instruments
Engineering, Laboratory, Scientific and Research Instruments 
Measuring and Controlling Instruments 
Optical Instruments and Lenses 
Surgical, Medical and Dental Instruments 
Photographic Equipment 
Business Services
Computer and Data Processing Services 
Research and Development Laboratories
(1) Defined as High tech in meeting two criteria:
industries with a proportion of technology oriented 
workers equal to or greater than the average for all 
manufacturing industries; and a ratio of R&D 
expenditures to sales close to or above the average for 
all Industries.
Source: Reproduced From New England Adapting to Change: A 





Transportation and Coomunication 
Trucking and Warehousing
Other Transportation Services, Rail, Air, and so on 
Telephone, Telegraph, Radio, TV and other 
Communication Services 
Postal and Courier 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 




Consumer Loan Companies 
Business Financing Companies 
Investment Dealers
Life, Health and Property Insurance 
Operators of Buildings and Dwellings 
Real Estate Agencies 
Community, Business and Personal Services
Business, Health, Legal and Educational Services 
Accommodation Services 
Food And Beverage Services 
Public Administration and Defence
Source: The Conference Board of Canada.
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industries was a New England defence establishment which 
traditionally received a higher proportion of defence 
contracts than any other part of the country. New England 
also benefited from the existence of large high quality 
educational and financial institutions. Atlantic Canada, 
while demonstrating some of the features of New England, 
lacked much in terms of economic base. The few components 
of a growth oriented economic base that do exist lack 
integration into the broader economy.
The macroeconomic neo-classical view of the events in 
New England would highlight the fact that high technology 
industries took hold at a low point in New England’s 
economic cycle. Structural adjustments in declining 
industries meant that high technology industries did not 
have to compete for manpower and venture capital. New 
England’s success can also be tied, to some degree, to the 
favourable business environment, low cost labour, lower 
levels of taxation, and so on.
The neo-Schumpeterian approach to development would 
highlight the mechanisms by which invention generated in the 
laboratories of the region’s research and development 
organisations, MIT and so on, become innovation through the 
action of entrepreneurs and with the guidance and sometimes 
direct support of government.
Identifying the key factors in the resurgence of New 
England may be of little direct benefit to Atlantic Canada. 
New England’s recent performance seems largely indigenous 
and spontaneous rather than the result of a planned effort
B6
to attract Industry. However, the process by which growth 
occurred and the theories which explain the process may hold 
some important lessons.
Agglomeration Economies
Economic Base and Economic Linkages 
Historical Developments 
Within the regional science paradigm, there are three 
distinctive influences on economic development and 
locational decisions: Proximity to natural resources,
availability of markets, or the existence of a large 
industrial agglomeration[5]. New England, unlike Atlantic 
Canada, has few natural resources. New England and the 
Atlantic region share less than favourable peripheral 
locatioi^s. New England's problem in this respect is much 
less severe. New England does benefit from significant 
agglomeration economies of scale, industrial and service 
sector concentration, and urbanization (concentration of 
skilled workers). Agglomeration economies, in general tend 
to lower the cost of production by making available a wide 
variety of materials, labour and services, on short notice 
and in abundance. Thus one of the keys to economic growth 
and development is the existing economic base.
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New England has had an industrial base in the forefront 
of contemporary technology for almost 200 years. The 
industrial diffusion process, illustrated by figure 3, 
tracks the development of the machine tool industry which 
was the forerunner of today’s high technology sector. These 
older firms were primary sources of skilled labour, capital 
and business talent[6]. The recent industrial diffusion 
process in figure 4 shows MIT and a variety of firms 
dependent on government/military research, at the core of 
recent economic development. While urbanisation economies 
provide a partial explanation of this second process, the 
regional development paradigm does not provide a good 
explanation of the influence of government procurement on 
demand or of the process of innovation in general. The 
neo-Schumpeterian approach provides some perspective on 
these factors and will be discussed later.
The history of corporate development in Atlantic Canada 
has been different. The lack of any industrial 
concentration of significant size Indicates a probable 
absence of agglomeration effects. Figures 5 and 6 provide 
a historical outline of selected Atlantic Region companies. 
Three main observations can be drawn from these diagrams'-
Figure 3




Source: New England Journal of Business and BccxKxnics .198?)
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First, Atlantic region manufacturing industries are largely 
resource based and controlled from outside the region and 
have failed to establish horizontal and vertical linkages 
consistent with export based growth and the formation of 
agglomeration economies. Second, Atlantic companies are 
susceptible to outside takeover; And third, government and 
universities are not well integrated into the economic 
structure of the region.
Dynamic Linkages Between Sectors 
Agglomeration economies means that the existence of one 
firm tends to attract related firms that either provide 
inputs or make use of the output of the first firm. This 
activity, repeated over and over, tends to forge dynamic 
linkages leading to the creation of a 'critical mass' which 
can become self-sustaining. Components of this critical 
mass include not only industrial companies, but financial 
institutions, and universities and technical institutions.
The pattern in New England has been for firms to locate 
in areas where they can take advantage of existing 
infrastructure and gooc Industrial linkages. While Figure 6 
provides a good indication of the extent of linkage between 
f^'rms, Figure 7 demonstrates the high level of corporate 
concentration. Forty nine of the 1985 Fortune 500 were
93
Figure 7
New England Companies In Fortune 500 
Ranked by Sales
Ranx
9 General Electric (FalcEleld, Conn.)
16 United Tecnnologies (Hartford, Conn.)
35 Union Carbide (Danbury, Conn.)
33 Xerox (Stamford, Conn.)
58 Raytneon (Lexington, Mass.)
65 Digital E|uip. (Maynard, Maas.)
70 Cliampion International (Stamford, Conn)
122 Textron (Providence, R.I.)
124 American Can (Greenwich, Conn.)
143 Singer (Stamford, Conn.)
153 AMAX (Greenwich, Conn.)
160 Gillette (Boston, Mass.)
164 Uniroyal (Middlebury, Conn.)
163 Wang Laboratories (Lowell, Mass.)
176 AVCO (Greenwich, Conn.)
178 Olin (Stamford, Conn.)
194 Great Northern Nekoosa (Stamford, Conn)
197 Cnesebrougn-Pond'a (Sreenwicn, Conn.)
208 Emhart (Farmington, Conn.)
210 General Signal (Stamford, Conn.)
214 Cabot (Boston, Mass.)
217 Pitney Bowes (Stamford, Conn.)
235 Stauffer Chemical (Westport, Conn.)
301 Lone Star Industries (Greenwich, Conn.)
324 General Cinema (Chestnut Hill, Mass.)
345 Scovill (Waterbury, Conn.)
354 Insilco (Meriden, Conn.)
356 Idle Wild Foods (Worcester, Mass.)
361 Coleco Industries (West Hartford, Conn.)
363 M/A-Com (Burlington, Mass.)
366 Sanders Associates (Nashua, N.H.)
373 Hasbro Bradley (Pawtucket, R.I.)
381 Echlin (Branford, Conn.)
384 Dennison Mfg. (Framingham, Mass.)
390 Armstrong Rubber (New Haven, Conn.)
398 Tyco Laboratories (Exeter, N.H.)
400 Prime Computer (Natick, Mass.)
409 Dexter (Windsor Locks, Conn.)
421 Nashua (Nashua, N.H.)
434 Warnaco (Bridgeport, Conn.)
436 Computervision (Bedford, Mass.)
447 Moore McCormack Resources (Stamford, Conn.)
455 Foxboro (Foxboro, Mass.)
458 Nortek (Providence, R.I.)
471 Stanadyne (Windsor, Conn.)
472 Harvey Hubbell (Orange, Conn.)
478 Ocean Spray Cranberries (Plymouth, Mass.)
485 United States Tobacco (Greenwich, Conn.)





















































located in New England. A comparable listing tor the 
Atlantic region in Figure 8 shown no such concentration of 
large industrial firms or head offices. Most major 
companies in the Atlantic region are either resource based, 
utilities or financial companies.
Proximity to Markets
Despite its location on the periphery of the United 
States, New England has certain advantages related to 
proximity to markets and ease of transportation. The 
region’s small .size but relatively large population give it 
a rather significant axid concentrated indigenous market.
Distances to major population and Industrial centres 
are not overly large. For example, 26 percent of U.S. 
manufacturing firms are within 300 miles of Connecticut, 32 
percent within 500 milest?]. This 500-mile radius includes 
20 percent of the U.S. population and 62 percent of 
Canada's|81.
New England has a transportation system well tuned to 
its needs. The logic of establishing a high technology 
plant along Route 126 in Massachusetts is clear Logan 
International Airport in Boston has been cited as of 
particular importance to the continued growth of the high 
technology sector[9]. The availability of air freight
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Figure 8
ATLANTIC CAflf PIAN COrtPANIES 




Post 500 "100" Company Sales ($000)
103
113
4 McCain Foods (Florenceville, NB)




116 3 Empire Co. (Stellarton, NS) 755,753
1C 6 6 Nova Scotia Power Corp. (Halifax, .4S) 476,081
188 62 National Sea products, (Halifax, NS) 404,964
2S4 8 Maritime Tel & Tel (Halifax, NS) 282,180
255 21 Newfoundland & Laorador Hydro 
(St. John's, Nfld.)
279,138
261 9 Co-op Atlantic (Moncton N.B.) 2)9,017
265 not listed Fisneries Products International 
(St. John's, Nfld.)
262,404
277 47 Lundrigan Group Ltd. (Corner BrooK, 
Nfld.)
106,240
289 10 N.B. Tel., (Saint John, NB) 229,591
327 13 Newfoundland Light & Power Co. 
(St. John's Nfld.)
197,217
396 16 Cape Breton Development Corp. (Sydney, 
NS)
139,195
444 25 ScotsUurn Co-operative Services 
(Scotsburn, NS)
109,275
479 39 Parmer's Co-op Dairy Ltd. 
(Halifax, NS)
9 3,077
488 not listed Newfoundland Capital Corp. (St. John's, 
Nfld.)
89,282
Sources: The Financial Post 500, 
Atlantic Business.
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services Is critical for the computer and the computer 
services sector. Ship and rail modes of transportation are 
less well developed in the region but this presents few 
problems given the high value, non-resource nature of New 
England industry.
A small and dispersed indigenous market together with 
high transportation costs, infrequent services, poor 
transportation infrastructure and a host of other 
transportation problems are a major concern in Atlantic 
Canada. Table 8 demonstrates the scale of the market access 
and transportation difficulties facing Atlantic industry.
Defence Spending 
Procurement
The nature of a particular region’s industrial 
si, rue tu re is a key element of the regional science 
framework. New England’s economy, particularly its 
manufacturing sector, is heavily dependent on defence 
contracts. Groups of companies related to defence 
procurement could easily be termed "propulsive or motor 
industries", the key force in the growth pole paradigm.
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Table 8
Distance From Halifax to Selected Cities
Halifax to: Road Air
Saint John, N.B. 309 200
Boston, Ha. 921 692
Montreal, Que. 1,249 843
Now York, N.Y. 1,278 1,010
St. John’s, Nfld. 1,503 913
Toronto, Ont. 1,788 1,335
Vancouver, B.C. 6,050 4,643
London, England 4,768
Source: Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, Except from a
presentation to the Minister of Regional Industrial 
Expansion, 1985.
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Such industries typically pay high wages, are rapidly 
growing and easily forge links with other sectors of the 
economy.
New England’s share of prime defence contracts, 11.1 
percent of the national total in 19B5[10], is substantially 
greater than its share of the national population, about 6.3 
peroent[ll]. Defence oriented industries accounted for 7.6 
percent of total New England manufacturing employment in 
1980[121. About 16 percent of all jobs in New England owe 
their existence, directly or indirectly, to the Department 
of Defence[13].
A review of Table 9 shows a heavy concentration of 
prime contracts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. Table 10 
shows the focus of the regions defence related Industries. 
Prime contractors generally make use of many sub-contractors 
distributed among the other New England states[14].
Sub contracts although not formally recorded, form an 
important part of the economies of these states. In fact, 
the total labour force employed on defence contracts 
typically exceeds total construction employment in the 
region[tbJ.
Defence spending is prone to cyclical fluctuations.
Kor example, a number of high technology firms were 
established during the Vietnam war. The value of prime 
defence contracts in the U.S. during 1967 was $53 billion 
(1972 dollars), but dipped to $33 billion in 1976,
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Table 9
United States Department of Defence Contracv Awards 
By State and Region ($ millions)
(1980-85)
State 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Maine 457 475 784 405 532 957
N. H. 305 392 538 541 663 678
Ver. 124 187 702 180 170 163
Mass. 3,729 4,596 5,301 6,328 7,029 7,714
Conn. 3,867 4,492 5,897 K 132 5,459 5,543
R. I. 261 235 285 381 396 431
New Eng. 8,482 10,357 13,007 12,967 14,249 15,486
0. S. 76,430 96,653 115,280 118,744 124,015 140,096
Source: U. S. Department of Defence.
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Table 10
Defence Specialties of the New England States in 1980
Percent of Total 
New England 
Contracts




Aircraft Engines 34.2 74.4
Missiles 13.9 13.1
Elect.& Comp. Equip 12.4 10.2
Ships 12.2 17.1
New England Total 100.0 12.9
Source : U.S. Dept. of Defence
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rebounding to $43 billion by 1980[16]. This surge in 
spending after 1976, continuing well into the 1980’», was an 
important factor in New England’s strong economic 
performance in the early 1980’s. Defence spending in the 
O.S. increased from 76.4 billion to 140.1 billion from 1980 
to 1985[17]. Spending in New England increased from 8.8 
billion to 15,5 billion over the same five year stretch.
The Atlantic region, in contrast, appears to receive 
far less than its share, by population of prime defence 
contracts. Table 11 shows that the region received 2.5 
percent of capital expenditures in the 1980-81 fiscal year, 
despite having over 10 percent of the nations population and 
almost one quarter of defence department personnel[181.
Table 12 is more revealing on the nature of defence 
procurement in Canada. Using one of the major tools of 
regional science, the input-output model, it can be shown 
that for every dollar spent on military procurement in 
Atlantic Canada, forty-four cents is spent within the 
region, twenty five cents ends up in central Canada and 
thirty cents leaves the country. Similarly, a dollar spent 
in Ontario leaves sixty nine cents in that province, 
eighteen cents goes to imports and only one cent ends up In 
Atlantic Canada. Not only does Atlantic Canada got a very 
small share of overall procurement but leakages account for 
56 percent of that share.
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Table 11









Newfoundland 720 0.1 0.1
P.E.I. 81 0.0 0.0
Nova Scotia 10,027 2.0 1.0
New Brunswick 2,041 0.4 0.2
Quebec 130,838 25.8 13.4
Ontario 328,976 64.9 33.7
Manitoba 16,140 3.2 1.7
Saskatchewan 1,827 0.4 0.2
Alberta 6,102 1.2 0.6
B.C. 9,671 1.9 1.0
Terr. 27 0.0 0.0
Canada 606,450 99.9 51.9
Foreign 496,020 — 100.0




Inter-Regional Trade Flows 




Production Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairies
B.C.&
Terr.
Atlantic 0.44 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 U.OO
Quebec 0 . 1 0 0.53 0.08 0.04 0.04
Ontario 0.15 0.15 0.69 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 1
B.C. & Terr. 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.03 0.03 0.59
Imports 0.30 0.29 0.18 0.08 0.16
Total 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
Source: Statistics Canada Interprovincial (Open) Input-Output
Model.
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Another indicator of the level of activity is the 
pattern of use of the Defence industry Productivity Program, 
which provides assistance to Canadian defence contractors. 
Table 13 shows that the program goes almost unused in the 
Atlantic region despite a significant level of defence 
procurement activity in the region. This would seem to 
offer more evidence of significant leakages of the benefits 
of procurement in the Atlantic region to other regions of 
the country. These statistics indicate that Ontario and 
Quebec get most of the direct benefits of procurement. 
Defence procurement is very much a political issue in 
Canada, with political clout counting for at least as much 
as comparative advantage. The potential for defence related 
industries to act as propulsive industries in Canada is also 
limited by scale. About the same amount of U.S. dollars 
were spent on military procurement in the state of Maine as 
in all of Canada In 1980. Expenditures in New England alone 
were almost twenty times the Canadian total.
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Table 13
Project Authorisation Under 














Alberta 2 1 . 1




Source: Industry Trade and Commerce and Department of Regional
Economic Expansion Annual Report 1982-83.
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Research and Development
The regional science paradigm does not deal well with 
the role of research and development and the diffusion of 
technology in a regional economy. The developmental 
approach provides a better description of the importance of 
research and development to a developing economy. It is the 
neo -Schumpeterian school of thought that best describes the 
process of innovation, however. The regional science 
approach does tend to recognize the importance of research 
and development in solidifying a region’s economic base.
The U.S. Department of Defense plays an important role 
in funding university and private sector research in New 
England. Defence procurement combined with significant 
levels of funded research and development tends to broaden 
and deepen the base of New England’s high technology 
sector[19]. One study points to 48 spin off companies 
generated from the research and development efforts at 
Draper Labs in Massachusettst20]. Figure 4 points to the 
strong integration of military research and various 
companies and institutions in New England.
The Integration of military research with academic 
institutions is particularly important. Thirty-seven 
institutions in New England have engineering prograros[21J. 
These programs provide the base for research and development 
related to high technology in the region. The military 
research and development base has existed for some time in 
Now England. The United States’ leading science advisor
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during World War II, MIT’s Vennevar Bush, helped direct 7ft 
wartime contracts, worth $117 million, to MIT[22,1. In 1983, 
MIT was the fifth largest defence contractor In 
Massachusetts, receiving $246 million for research on radar 
and communications[23].
Canada lags well behind most industrialised nations in 
research and development spending. In 1984 the federal 
government funded $2 . 2 billion in research and development 
activity in all sectors of the economy[24J. In that same 
year the American government spent $44.2 billion on research 
and developmentt25]. Atlantic Canada received about nine 
percent of the Canadian total, about $ 201 mil lion126].
Payments to Canadian industry for research and 
development by the department of national defence amounted 
to $81.5 million in 1986[27]. Payments to Canadian 
universities for research and development by DNl) amounted to 
only $ 8  million[28]. Clearly, it can be seen from these 
statistics that it is unlikely that Atlantic Canada and 
Indeed Canada could develop meaningful agglomeration 
economies related to defence related research and 
development.
Personnel
In contrast to spending on procurement and research and 
development, per capita spending on military wages and 
salaries in New England has been at or below the national
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average in recent years. This is in contrast to Atlantic 
Canada, where per capita military spending on wages and 
salaries is well above the national average.
The economic impact of concentrations of defence 
personnel is quite different from concentrations of defence 
procurement. The indirect effect of the presence of 
military personnel would tend to be felt in the service 
sector, principally in wholesale and retail trade and 
personal services. Defence procurement would tend to 
promote activity In the manufacturing sector with typically 




United States Department of Defence Personnel 
By State and Region 
(1985)
Percent
Civilian Military Total Of Total
Maine 10,601 5,438 16,039 0.7%
New Hampshire 1,602 4,122 5,824 0.3
Vermont 606 74 680 0 . 0
Massachusetts 12,332 9,417 21,749 0.9
Connecticut 4,954 6,526 11,480 0.5
Rhode Island 4,715 4,037 8,752 0.4
New England 64,624 2 . 8
United States 976,155 1,366,866 2,343,021 1 0 0 . 0
Source: U. S. Department of Defence.
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Table 15
DND Employment in Person Years 
Atlantic Provinces and Canada 
(1985-86 fiscal year)
Percent of
Province Civilian Military Total Total
Newfoundland 225 897 1 , 1 2 2 1 0 %
PEI 262 933 1,195 1. 1
Nova Scotia 5,573 1 2 , 1 2 0 17,693 16.4
New Brunswick 1,373 4,192 5,565 5.2
Atlantic 7,433 18,142 25,575 23.8
Canada 33.239 74,386 107,625 1 0 0 . 0




One of the important ingredients for growth and 
development within any orthodox theoretical framework is the 
availability of capital. Within the neo-classical 
perspective, lack of capital is merely a short run problem. 
Continuous rationalization and adjustment within industry 
tends to free up capital for new uses. This process is 
explained by Sheila Dow in a review of orthodox and radical 
theoretical perspectives in an article on money and regional 
development.
National financial markets, if anything, make regional 
development more even. Financial flows between regions 
are in fact a key variable in the adjustment to 
equilibrium. Disequilibrium may be the result of an 
Inequality of savings and investment in each region.
If exports from one region are low relative to 
Imports, there will be insufficient savings to finance 
investment; but the resulting excess demand for funds 
will be met by an inflow of funds from the other 
regions with high exports and thus excess savings!29]. 
Put a different way, low wages and high unemployment 
resulting from rationalization in industry or a scarcity of 
capital in a given region will tend to draw oaplt tl from 
outside the region, since both nature and capital abhor a 
vacuum.
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The Influence of general equilibrium theory can easily 
be seen in the developmental approach and its view that 
accumulation of capital is the key to industrial 
revolution. Keynesian theory on the other hand tends to 
focus on the notion that all borrowers face the same 
conditions but since expectations of return govern 
investment plans, uneven development Is a posslbility[30],
From this perspective, it Is not a big jump to the 
cumulative causation approach. This methodology might 
maintain that, given the nature of center-periphery 
relationships and the fact that a combination of factors 
favour development in the center, a similar project would 
have a better return in the centre than In the periphery. 
Capital flows within the dependency theory framework would 
view the use of capital as a means to finance projects for 
the generation of a surplus to be eventually shipped back to 
the centre.
More recent Marxist theorists argue that the 
combination of a shift to the center and a process of 
corporate concentration accounts for the demise of Maritime 
industries at the turn of the century[31j. This Is in sharp 
contrast to the independent branch banking system of the 
United States and is sometimes cited as the reason for the 
decline of the Atlantic region relative to the Eastern 
seaboard of the United States[32].
The cumulative causation approach together with other 
less orthodox ones highlight the concentration of head 
offices of financial institutions in the center regions. In
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this respect, these theories agree with the regional science 
paradigm which emphasizes the Importance of industrial 
structure, including concentrations of financial 
Institutions. The relative differences in concentration of 
capital is another of the big differences between the 
Atlantic region and New England.
Venture Capital
The availability of investment capital has always boon 
one of the main assets of the New England economy. In the 
early days of New England's industrialization, entrepreneurs 
found willing sources of capital in the extensive family 
wealth of the area and in the profits of merchants in the 
larger cities. Private sources such as these continue to 
represent vital sources of start-up capital.
Much of the recent success in the New England economy 
is related to the phenomenal growth of the venture capital 
industry, much of it concentrated in New England. Federal 
tax changes are at the root of this growth. In 1978, 
Congress reduced the maximum tax on capital gains and 
removed restrictions on the use of pension funds for venture 
capital[33]. In one year, new funds available for venture 
capital financing rose from $39 million to $600 
million[34]. By 1983, the pool of venture capital had risen 
to $12 billion[35].
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Most venture capital firms started as private 
organisations supported by wealthy families or individuals. 
The region’s larger firms and more prominent universities 
became involved in risk-financing somewhat later. The first 
public venture capital firm was the American Research and 
Development Corporation established in 1946. One of its 
early successes was Digital Equipment Corporation[36].
Concentration of financial services is an important 
part of the explanation for growth within the regional 
science school of thought. Of the top 100 venture capital 
firms in the United States, 20 are in the New England Area 
and 15 of these firms are located in Massachusetts[37].
Table 16 shows that more than a fifth of venture capital 
commitments in 1983 were to Massachusetts and Connecticut 
firms alone. Table IB also shows that venture capital
116
Table 16
Regional Distribution Of 
Capital Commitments 
(Independent Private Firms Only
as a Percent of the Total)
1981 1982 1983 1984
(%) (%) (%) (%)
California 38 45 27 36
New York 4 7 28 2 0
Massachusetts 12 11 13 15
Connecticut 9 6
Other 46 27 23 23
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Northeast 25 25 52 44
West Coast 42 48 31 37
Midwest 8 8 7 9
Southwest 16 13 5 7
Southeast 5 4 6 5
Other 4 2 0 0
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 00 1 0 0
Source: The New England Council Inc. and Venture Economics Inc.
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commitments tend to be concentrated in a few regions.
While, by their nature, these firms show no geographic 
preference, personal contact, particularly in high risk, 
high technology investments, is essential. Given this 
concentration, some authors[38] have made the obvious 
inference that risk capital is more plentiful in New England 
simply because of the abundance of high quality 
opportunities. The availability of capital and the 
availability of marketable ideas becomes self-reinforcing.
One of the major factors in the recent growth and 
success of New England's high technology industries was the 
wide availability of risk capital. Venture capital firms 
are prominent in this regard because of a tendency to make 
more Innovative Investments than traditional financial 
Institutions, Even the so-called traditional financiers 
show signs of innovative techniques in the region. In the 
1960*3, any Massachusetts firm with a federal contract was 
guaranteed financing from the Bank of Boston[40]. This bank 
in particular sought out researchers who had patents for 
"marketable" technology[41]. The regions banks and venture 
capital companies have also, more recently, shown some 
interest in "zero stage" financing (opportunities looking 
for inventors and innovators), as opposed to "first stage" 
(pre-innovation), and "second stage" (Inventors about to go 
into production)[421.
While access to capital, in general, is not a major 
problem in Atlantic Canada, risk capital is difficult to 
obtain. Few venture capital firms operate in the region,
IIT
and tax laws make it difficult to channel the wealth of 
local companies, pension funds, and individuals into local 
investments. Those firms which do exist are different from 
U.S. venture capital firms. Amerioan firms tend to 
concentrate in manufacturing and service industries related 
to high technology and bring ideas that have reached the 
innovation stage into production. Canadian venture 
capitalists seem more oriented to 'safe' investments In 
resource and commercial areas.
Some studies indicate that one of the main problems in 
the Atlantic region is not a lack of capital but a dearth of 
investment opportunities[431. In addition, innovators and 
entrepreneurs often, do not have the skills required to 
acquire financing. Often this involves the lack of a 
convincing or thorough business plan. These and other 
structural problems make it difficult for the Atlantic 
region to generate the type of self reinforcing feed back 
loop that exists in New England. The necessary Industrial 
and financial base does not exist. It is at this stage that 
the entrepreneur's skill is most important and is where New 
England excels and Atlantic Canada appears to fall short.
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Banking Systems: U.S. versus Canada
A big part of the of the financial agglomeratic .4 that 
has played an important role in the growth of New England is 
the availability of banking services. While there is no 
doubt that the concentration of financial services in New 
England is a key component of growth, it may be that the 
nature of the banking system in the United States broadens 
the agglomeration affects. The United States has a banking 
system composed of many small independent banks, many with a 
strictly local orientation. While this is changing with the 
development of inter-state banking, a recent survey in New 
England Business lists 218 commercial banks in the 
region[44]. The top ten had assets of $90.7 billion in 
1986, more than half the assets of all of Canada's chartered 
banks[45].
This wide availability of financial services is pointed 
to as one of the big reasons for New England’s rapid growth 
compared to Atlantic Canada. Atlantic Canada has only 
branches of national banks[46]. Banking in Canada tends to 
be concentrated by location and banks are few in number. 
Table 17 shows the relative degree of corporate 
concentration in the banking sector in a variety of 
countries. Popular wisdom maintains that the lack of any 
meaningful concentration of financial services in Atlantic 
Canada, and the resulting difficulty in getting access to 
capital, is one of the big reasons for lack of development 
in this region. While recent bank statistics give little 
substance to this claim, it may be that the problem is one
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Table 17
Bank and Branch Density 





Country Number Offices per Bank Largest
United States 14,451 54,235 15,676 19,2%
Canada 11 7,425 2,221,636 77.7
W. Germany 243 41,000 254,156 61.8
United Kingdom 35 14,000 1,601,914 58.B
Japan 86 13,420 1,378,825 34.5
France 206 40,200 262,913 76.1
Italy 1,170 11,970 48,987 35.1
Switzerland 432 5,501 14,682 46.7
Source: Reproduced from "The New England Experiment in
Interstate Banking" , Richard F, Syron, in The New England
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, (Boston, 
Mar./Apr. 1984) p.6.
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of lender attitudes and lack of opportunity. The self 
reinforcing cycle of opportunity and investment is not well 
developed.
The United States has a long history of populist 
concern about the possible abuses that might come with the 
concentration of economic power in a few very large 
financial institutions[47]. The current debate over the
broadening of the U.S. system by the removal of legal 
barriers to inter state branch banking has raised this 
debate once again. Fears have been expressed about how 
interstate banking might affect the concentration of 
financial and political power, the availability and the 
distribution of credit, and predatory competition in the 
banking sector[48]. On the other side of the coin, 
proponents of interstate banking see it as a means to bring 
money from the large center banks into the hinterland.
Unlike small local banks, larger financial institutions with 
broad access to funds would not have to rely on a local 
deposit base to provide loans. In addition, business and 
individuals could be provided with a higher level of service 
than presently available.
New England has become the test case for Interstate 
banking. The experiment has not been a success. Maine 
alone has allowed full interstate banking. Populist 
concerns remain[49]. These include a feeling that borrowers 
may be able to get business financing more easily from their 
local community bank than from a branch of a larger 
interstate bank. Whole communities could be neglected if
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acquisition leads to consolidation. Another common concern 
is that interstate banking may lead to an outflow of funds 
as larger center banka drain deposits in one region for more 
lucrative investments elsewhere. Feelings like these have 
led legislatures to enact laws like the 1979 Community 
Re-Investment Act, which is designed to encourage banks to 
be more active in financing development in their 
communities. Maine's interstate banking law requires an 
acquired bank to provide a business plan that demonstrates 
how the financial needs of small business and individuals 
will be met. In addition the acquiring bank must describe 
how net new funds will be brought into Maine.
Various studies have conflicted with these populist 
notions of the evils of concentrating and centralizing of 
financial power[50]. Constance Dunham, in a study prepared 
for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, suggests that small 
local banks may not be as positive an influence on their 
communities as is commonly held.
Small banks are more locally oriented than large banks 
in terms of both their sources and uses of funds. 
However, because of their greater emphasis on 
individual customers, who are net suppliers of funds to 
the rest of the economy, small banks tend to gather 
more funds than they can lend locally. This, in 
conjunction with small banks, lack of access to money 
market sources of funds, leads them to invest heavily 
in nonlocal, highly liquid assets. As a result, small 
banks tend to be conduits through which local funds
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flow into nonlocal investments either directly or 
Indirectly, through interbank and other financial 
markets, to the ultimate borrowers[51].
In other words, while almost all of the loan activity of a 
small bank is local, this represents just over half of 
assets. Other assets are invested outside the local area in 
safe liquid investments, in government bonds for example.
On the other hand, local banks when they become affiliated 
with larger banks, tend to decrease the outflow of funds as 
an expanded array of services to local business becomes 
available!. 52] •
The same study also shows that the focus of a bank 
tends to change when control shifts from local to regional 
banks. Inter state banks tend to provi'3 more services 
resulting in an inflow of funds as the bank begins to 
service larger more sophisticated customers than the 
previous local bank attracted. Increased net inflow of 
funds therefore depends on a demand for those new services. 
With few local opportunities for these services, the 
expanded opportunities for non local investment would result 
in a net outflow. The study recognises that: "Small
businesses, no longer the sole commercial focus of these 
[acquired] banks, may be hurt"[53].
It is clear that the banking system in the United 
States has assisted the development of a solid economic base 
and was one of the keys to the recent resurgence of the New 
England economy, in particular. The effects of interstate 
banking proposals are unclear but seem mostly positive. The
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key role of capital seems to have been in establishing the 
industrial base of the region. Present day formulations of 
the banking system may be inconsequential, having little 
role to play except in servicing this industrial base. The 
consolidating of power among banks probably has less meaning 
today since financial services are widely available in a 
variety of forms. In addition local investments have become 
more attractive to large banks as distribution of risk has 
become as important to larger banks as rates of potential 
return[64].
In this respect the consolidation of banking services 
in the Atlantic region in the 1800’s is probably more 
relevant than the present day consolidation in New England. 
Work by Naylor[55] and others[56] have remarked on the 
negative consequences of the concentration of capital in 
central Canada together with the use of deposits in 
periphery regions to fund economic activity in the centre. 
Jim Frost in his article, "The Nationalization of the Bank 
of Nova Scotia", points to a significant net outflow of 
Maritime deposits in the Bank to loan activity and bond 
purchases outside the region after 1897[57].
A similar pattern was established for smaller community 
banks in the United States by Constance Dunham[58] in 1984, 
but the observed outflow was much loss extreme and limited 
to liquid investments. Loans made by local banks were 
still almost entirely to local business and individuals, 
Dunham's study showed ratio of local uses to local sources 
for community banks of 0.6 (60 percent)[59]. A review of
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regional and larger center banks showed more of an outflow 
in loans but some reduction in the holding of liquid assets 
from outside such as government bonds. This contributed to 
a net Inflow of funds to local regions in the case of larger 
banks. The Dunham study showed ratio of local uses to local 
sources for center banks of 1.1 (110 percent)[60]. A 
similar pattern presently can be seen among Canada’s larger 
banks.
It would seem reasonable to assume that differences in 
the banking systems of the Atlantic region accounts for some 
of the difference in the economic bases of the two regions. 
However since small banks in both areas were likely net 
exporters of capital during the 1800’s the telling factor is 
the relative magnitude of the flow. New England may have 
benefited from a more restrictions on capital flows but this 
interpretation is not clear cut.
Educational Institutions 
Introduction
The developmental approach to economic growth is most 
consistent with the consensus that New England’s educational 
institutions played a vital role in the revitalization of 
the region and form an Important part of the region,s 
industrial base. Early formulations of the developmental 
approach focused on the accumulation and availability of 
physical capital as the precursor of economic
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revolution[61]. The availability of capital per worker waa 
used as a measure of productivity and provided the 
explanation for the varying potential of regions or 
countries. The importance of capital was discussed In the 
previous section.
While empirical testing proved capital availability to 
be Important to economic development, other factors such as 
social infrastructure - road, railways, hospitals, schools - 
and human capital - knowledge and skills of the indigenous 
work force - have come to be regarded as a more important 
contributors to higher productivity[62]. In fact, the rate 
of diffusion of technology and its contribution to 
productivity and growth has become has become the focus of 
many present day proponents of the developmental 
school[63].
The developmental approach can serve as a corrective to 
the regional science approach. However, focusing on social 
Infrastructure ignores the problems inherent in having 
financially strapped governments take on costly 
infrastructure projects. In the case of New England, 
relative differences among regions in human capital and the 
key role of the solid core of highly regarded educational 
institutions adept at putting technology into action, are 
often pointed to as two of the basic elements of economic 
growth and resurgence in New England. Researchers have 
established a definite link between the economic resurgence 
of this region, the supply of highly skilled and 
professional labour, and technological transfer from
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research and development programs at the region's schools 
and institutes[64]. The absence of a similar base is often 
mentioned as one of the problems at the crux of disparities 
between the Atlantic region and the rest of Canada.
Labour Force Quality 
The average level of educational attainment of a 
population, according to the developmental paradigm of 
economic growth, reflects on the quality of the labour 
force. Education levels in New England are generally higher 
than the U.S. average. Table 18 shows that almost 35 
percent of New England's population, 25 years and older had 
completed some years of university in 1982. This compares 
favorably with the U.S. average of 32 percent. There are 
some variations within the region, with both Maine and Rhode 
Island below the national average.
The region’s 264 colleges and universities attract more 
than 700,000 students in a typical year[65]. New England 
has ranked first in the U.S. in enrollment per 1,000 




Years of School Completed 




States England Maine N. H. Ver. Mass. R.I.
Elementary 













100 .0 100 .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
81.7 84.3 83.4 85.3 83.3 85.6 79.3
66.5 70.5 68.7 72.3 71.0 72.2 61.1
31.9 34.6 29.4 35.1 34.7 35.8 28.3
16.2 19.2 14.4 18.2 19.0 20.0 15.4
Source: National Centre for Educational Statistics.
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doctorate-granting in3titutions[661. These numbered some 
30,119 individuals in 1985, an increase over 1980 of almost 
15 porcenttS?]. The regions universities and institutes are 
important in meeting the demand for the highly trained work 
force demanded by a high technology based economy. They are 
also a source of entrepreneurs.
The kingpin of this educational base is the 
Massachusetts Institute of Teclmology. Thanks largely to 
this prestigious school, New England has become a net 
importer of brain power. Massachusetts in particular has 
benefited from this phenomenon. While only 15 percent of 
undergraduates at MIT are from New England, over 30 percent 
of its graduates remain in Massachusetts[SB].
The Atlantic region does not compare favorably with New 
England or the rest of Canada in terms of educational 
attainment. Table 19 shows that all provinces with the 
exception of Nova Scotia have levels below the national 
average. Some provinces in the region have a high 
proportion of their populations attending university at any 
one time but there seems to be a drain of graduates from the 
province after graduatlan[89]. This would seem to be 
consistent with the cumulative causation theories of 
underdevelopment. The problem may be a lack of demand in 
the region for university trained people. There appears to 
ho no problem on the supply side.
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Table 19
Percentage Distribution of Population 15 Years and Older 
By highest Level of Schooling 
Atlantic Provinces and Canada 
(Percent)
(1981)
Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Canac
Elementary and 
Secondary 
0-8 years 30.1 23.5 20.3 27.9 20.1
9 complete 28.9 31.4 33.9 28.8 27.9
Vocational 
Cert. or Dep. 2.1 2.6 3.5 2.8 3,4
High School 
Certificate 10.2 8.3 7.9 10.9 13.0
Other
Non-university 
No trade cert, 
or diploma 3.0 4.5 3.7 3.5 6.0
With trade 
cert. or dep. 9.9 7.6 9.4 6.5 6.5
Other 3.4 6.1 5.8 6.2 7.2
University 
no degree 7.4 9.9 8.0 7.3 7.9




Enrollment in Post-Secondary Institutions 
As a Percent of the Population by Age Group 
and By Province
Nfld. P.E.I, N.S. N.B. Canada






















Source: Statistics Canada Cat. 81-229.
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Innovative Environment
Aside from their important role as purveyors of human 
capital, universities and technical institutes can play 
important roles as centers of research, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship. Post-secondary institutions also act as 
an important source of advice and a storehouse of 
knowledge. The key to the success of New England is the 
ability of the major educational institutions in the region 
to master the transition from invention to Innovation. The 
process of innovation and the role of the entrepreneur are 
not dealt with adequately within the regional science or the 
development schools. The process is addressed by 
Schumpeterian analysis. Despite the difficulty of assigning 
a theoretical framework, entrepreneurs appear to be the key 
to the process of growth. The academic base as it exists in 
New England, and at MIT in particular, seem to be one that 
encourages entrepreneurship and innovation.
With 264 colleges and universities and close to a 
million university students, New England is by far the most 
knowledge intensive region of the United States. This large 
base of highly trained academics and students has fostered 
considerable research and development activity that has spun 
off into industry applications and new start-up companies. 
Universities usually do not foster spin-off activity.
Certain institutions in New England, such as HIT and Brown 
University, are unique in this respect (Figure 4).
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Spln-offa are encouraged through direct links with the 
country largest corporations and through military research 
and contract activity. Table 21 shows the extent of military 
funded research in New England institutions during 19B5. 
Table 22 shows the extent of the research and development 
base by state. While the private sector is important in 
funding university research, Table 23 shows that the federal 
government plays a dominant role, in New England in 
particular. Universities themselves sometimes take part in 
providing venture capital and incubator facilities which 
offer low-cost space for start-up companies. In addition 
the significant endowments of private institutions, Table 
24, are big source of research dollars. The top eighteen 
endowments in Now England represent a quarter of the 
endowments of the top 100 in the nation.
Another unique aspect of the New England experience is 
an apparent willingness of university administrations to 
allow privatisation of university research without excessive 
rod tape to insure pay back. For example, professors at MIT 
can spend one day a week on outside business, a privilege 
that other universities are still trying to sort out.
"MIT's professors have always moonlighted for industry with 
the school’s blessing and encouragement[711. Hundreds of 
companies have been created by graduates of MIT.
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Table 21
Department of Defence 
Research and Develoinnent Contracts 
To Colleges, Universities and Nonprofit 
Organizations in New England 
(dollars)
(1985)
College or University Award
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 360,104,000
University of Massachusetts 8,141,000
Yale University 5,507,000
Harvard University 4,637,000
Trustees of Brown University 3,691,000
Brown University 3,530,000
University of Rhode Island 3,413,000
Wentworth Institute of Technology 3,199,000
Northeastern University 2,476,000
Emmanuel College 2,436,000
University of Connecticut Foundation 1,364,000
Dartmouth College 1,152,000
Trustees of Boston College 1,048,000
University of Lowell 650,000
Total 399,330,000
Nonprofit Research Institute
Charles S. Draper Laboratory 305,238,000
Mitre Corporation 260,995,000
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute 11,548,000
Total 577,781,000
Total For All Institutions 977,111,000
Source: New England Board of Higher Education, "Analysis of




Research and Development Expenditures 
At Doctorate-Granting Institutions 







Rhode Island 56,597 35
Maine 20,621 47




Source: National Science Foundation, Academic
Science/Engineering and R & D Funds 1985, (Nov. 1986)
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Table 23
Percent Distribution of 
Research and Development Expenditures 
At Doctorate-Granting Institutions 
By source of Fund and State 
(1985)
United New
Source States England Maine N. H. Ver. Mass. R.I. Conn.
Federal Gov. 63.1 74.2 51.7 68.9 68.7 76.6 76.4 70.1
State, Local 7.0 1.6 6.0 7.0 5.7 0.8 1.5 1.9
Industry 5.7 7.2 7.6 5.4 9.5 8.5 6.0 3.3
Inst. Funds 16.9 8.2 23.1 16.7 12.6 4.7 9.3 14.7
Other 7.4 8.9 11.7 2.1 3.6 9.4 6.9 9.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: National Science Foundation, Academic
Science/Engineering and R & D Funds 1985, (Nov. 1986).
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Table 24
The Top Ten Endowments of Educational Institutions 













(1) The total endowment of the top ninety independent 
institutions in New England amounted to $9.2 billion as of 
January 1986.
Source: The New England Board of Higher Education, "Facts
About Colleges, Universities, and Institutes 1987".
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Table 25
Research and Development Expenditures 
Expenditures In Canadian Higher Education Institutions
By Source of Funding 
(millions of dollars)
(1984)
Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Canada Atl./Can
Federal Gov. 9 21 7 462 8.0%
Provincial Gov. 1 1 120 1.7%
Industry 1 36 2.8%
Institutions 4 1 13 6 270 8.8%
Non-Profit
Organizations 3 2 2 126 5.6%
Foreign 1 11 9.1%
Total 18 1 38 15 1,025 7.0%
Source: Statistics Canada.
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"Starting a business became not just acceptable, but almost 
expected of a bright graduate student in electrical 
engineering"[71J. This attitude, although prevalent in New 
England, is uncommon in the United States and Canada.
Links between corporations, entrepreneurs, universities 
and financial institutions are very important. An early 
example of this type of linkage to promote innovation was 
the special relationship between the Bank of Boston and MIT 
in the 1950’s and 1960’s. During the 1950’s, this bank, 
made a commitment along with a number of other organizations 
Including MIT, to help promote the growth of knowledge-based 
firms in Massachusetts[72]. Recognizing the essential 
linkage between invention (pure science) and entrepreneurs 
(small and large business and individuals) necessary for 
innovation has taken time in Canadian universities. Several 
universities have established various formal or non formal 
entities to translate research into innovative products and 
monitor the needs of industry. Memorial University of 
Newfoundland established a university based corporation, 
Seabright Resources, with the aid of federal and provincial 
funding for the development of university-industry links and 
the promotion of Innovation. Dalhousie University was to 
have developed the "Dalhousie University Development 
Corporation", in the early 1980’s, but plans have been 
delayed. Other institutions in the region have made similar 
attempts but success, so far, has been limited.
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Economie Rationalization and Adjustment 
Introduction
While neo-classical economic analysis is not generally 
considered a theory of regional growth, it does mark the 
parameters for most orthodox theories of regional 
development. This view assumes that prices and wages are 
flexible, and that labour and capital are mobile, and given 
similar resources and technology, market forces, which tend 
to equilibrium, will solve regional problems if they are 
allowed to work unhindered. Unemployment and low wages are 
the result of excess supply or too little demand, a problem 
that is conveniently solved by emigration.
One regional formulation of neo-classical theory has 
been proposed by Tom Courchene[73]. The focus of this view 
is that governments, by their interference in the economy, 
worsen rather than lessen disparities and that government 
policies would encourage rather than discourage labour and 
capital mobility. Courchene advocates a active role for 
goveriment in facilitating adjustment to equilibrium, 
resulting in increased efficiency as low productivity 
workers in depressed area move, with assistance if 
necessary, to high productivity jobs in other areas. 
Unemployment rates would come down and incomes would go up 
through factor price equalization.
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The New England miracle is comfortably explained within 
the confines of neo-classical economics. New England, like 
much of the United States, seems to be governed by pure 
market forces to a larger extent than Canada. In other 
words, wages and prices are reasonably flexible, both 
capital and labour are fairly mobile, and economic problems 
tend to solve themselves as divergent economies move to 
equilibrium.
In practical terms this means that the present day 
growth in New England is related to the adjustments that 
were made during troubled times twenty or thirty years ago. 
When traditional industries went into decline, the major 
form of adjustment was emigration. In theory the departure 
of the jobless to more prosperous regions of the nation will 
simultaneously raise incomes in the area of emigration while 
lowering incomes at the destination. This would have 
improved the relative availability of capital and resources 
per person. Unemployment would ease with outmigration while 
temporary surplus of labour and lower wages would draw 
capital and investment. The New England success story in a 
"nut shell".
Problems in Atlantic Canada can be related, within the 
neo-classical paradigm, to a failure to adjust, particularly 
in an outmoded low productivity manufacturing sector.
Failure to adjust can be related to market imperfections 
institutionalized by governments, through unemployment 
insurance for example, and by unions.
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Certain authors have taken exception to this view. 
Boadway and Flatters[74] point out that certain market 
imperfections and the resulting emigration may lower net 
productivity in a national economy. Batra and Scully[75] 
demonstrate that if one region has a technological advantage 
over another workers and capital migrate to this high wage 
region thus preventing adjustment. Within this broad 
paradigm, however, it does appear that market imperfections 
of a variety of types have prevented adjustment in the 
Atlantic region.
On the other hand, the adjustment process in New 
England over the second half of this decade would indicate 
the existence of a market fairly free of Imperfections in 
New England. Clearly things are not this simple. The broad 
overview of regional growth theory together with the 
empirical evidence of consensus growth factors show that 
many other factors, such as government policy and 
availability of capital, come into play. The actual 
explanations of growth are considerably less tidy than the 
general equilibrium paradigm would suggest.
Rationalization In The Manufacturing Sector 
The Process of Adjustment 
New England’s manufacturing sector was and continues to 
be heavily represented in so-called mature or declining 
industries. During the 1950’s, 1960’s and early 1970’s,
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hundreds of plants closed and hundreds of thousands of jobs 
were lost in Industries such as leather, textiles, apparel, 
rubber and plastic, and paper productst76]. These mature 
industries are marked by a number of similar characteristics 
such as low wages and susceptibility to cyclical downturns, 
remarkably similar to large portions of Atlantic Canada’s 
resource based economy. The severity of the downturn in New 
England after I960 was eased somewhat by growth in the 
service sector and a buildup of defence related 
manufacturing during the Vietnam War. With cuts to defence 
spending at the end of the War, the underlying weakness of 
New England's manufacturing base began to be felt. By 1975 
unemployment rates were two percent above the national 
average and the outlook for the 1980's was dim.
Adjustment took the form of labour migration, as 
displaced workers sought jobs elsewhere, often in the 
southern United btates where many firms relocated to take 
advantage of lower average wages and more pliable labour. 
High unemployment and emigration served to keep New 
Eng I and’s wages under control. Figure 9 shows the nature of 
adjustment in manufacturing employment through most of the 
1 9 7 0 Despite emigration it appears that a base of 
trained workers were available for the high technology boom 
1,hat began in the mid-1970's. It would seem that the 
decline in mature industries and the resulting adjustment 
process was a big factor in the New England’s strong 
resurgence by freeing up labour and capital at precisely the 
appropriate time.
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Low unemployment rates of the 1980’s have come as a 
result of very strong job creation in manufacturing from 
1974 through 1984, growth in service sector employment in 
line with national trends, and very slow growth in the 
region’s labour force (half the national rate). Slow labour
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Figure 9
PROPORTION OF NEW ENGLAND'S LABOR FORCE IN 
MANUFACTURING RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL NORM
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force growth is the result of continued outmigration from 
the old industrial areas of New England as outmoded plants 
in traditional Industries continue to close, and low birth 
rates, a sign of an affluent society. Slow labour force 
growth has persisted despite some of the highest 
participation rates for women and minorities in the United 
States[771.
A similar pattern of adjustment was is not apparent in 
Atlantic Canada. Neo-classical theory would place the blame 
on a lack of flexibility in labour, capital, and other 
markets compared to New England. It would appear, however, 
from Appendix C, that there have been significant levels of 
adjustment/emigration in the provinces of the Atlantic 
region through much of the twentieth century. The main 
exception is the period 1971-1981 when it would appear, with 
the exception of Newfoundland, that the Atlantic provinces 
were the beneficiary of net emigration. Table 26 shows that 
this was a time when manufacturing employment grew at a pace 
significantly faster in the Atlantic region than In the 
nation.
It would appear that despite in migrants labour force 
growth over the period was only 34.1 percent compared to 
41.8 percent for the nation. It might bo postulated, 
consistent with the transfer dependence paradigm, that 
market imperfections reduced the level of adjustment that 
could have otherwise been expected. Employment growth 




Growth In Total Manufacturing Employment 
Atlantic Provinces and Canada 
(1961, 1971, 1981)
NFLD PEI NS NB ATL CAN
1981 9,854 1,681 27,822 22,932 62,289 1,352,605
1971 12,580 2,290 31,958 28,565 75,393 1,628,404
1981 18,210 3,041 38,807 31,511 91,569 1,853,726
Annual Average Percent *Change
61/71 2.5 3.1 1.4 2.2 1.9 1.9
71/81 3.8 2.9 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.3
61/81 3.1 3.0 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.6
Source: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 31-203.
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This oaae seems some what suspect however. It must be 
remembered that the early 1980’s marked the beginning of a 
prolonged recession through which traditional migration 
patterns were reversed. Lack of demand for labour in the 
traditional hot spots In the Canadian economy led to 
significant levels of return migration to the Atlantic 
region. By the mid 1980's patterns wore back to their 
nonaal pre-1970 pattern of emigration.
Differences in the industrial base and basic 
demographics are main reasons for differences in the 
adjustment patterns in New England and Atlantic Canada. It 
appears from figures 5 and 6 and our earlier review off 
historic growth patterns, that much of the adjustment in 
mature industries in Atlantic Canada took place SO or 60 
years ago. What remains is a cyclical and slow growing, 
resource-based, manufacturing sector(Figures b,6 and 8).
Barriers to Adjustment 
In addition to the differences in economic base, other 
factors have been suggested as preventing adjustment in 
Atlantic Canada in the manner of Now England. Those are 
consistent with neo-classical theory, specifically the 
transfer dependence paradigm. Labour market imperfections 
highlighted by differences in the social safety net of the 
two countries and rate of unionization are paramount.
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Lack of immigration related to the richness of 
unemployment insurance programs in Canada are sometimes 
accused of preventing adjustment in the Atlantic region.
The U.S. system, by comparison, is less generous The 
unemployment insurance system in the United States is 
operated by individual states funded for the most part by a 
federal payroll tax on employers. Some states supplement 
this with an additional tax on employers. This state tax 
sometimes varies from company to company, as in the case of 
Maine, depending on the use employees of a particular 
company make of the system (seasonal employers pay more).
In Canada, the system is funded by contribution from 
employers and employees, with any deficit covered by the 
federal government.
Maximum weekly benefits tend to be larger in Canada.
The maximum payment in Maine, fairly representative of New 
Kngland, was $ 152 (U.S.). By comparison, the maximum in 
Canada in 1986 was $297 (Can.) or $ 214 (U.S.). However, 
Table 27 shows that the average weekly payments are quite 
.similar in Canada and the United States. In fact, the U.S. 
in general, along with two states in New England are more 
generous when payments are expressed in American dollars. 
Benefits are easier to qualify for in Atlantic Canada than 
in New England as a general rule and eligibility is extended 
to those on sickness or maternity benefits, fishermen and so
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Table 27
Average Weekly Unemployment Insurance Benefits 














Source: Annual Report of the U.S. Secretary of Labour,
Statistics Canada, Bank of Canada.
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on[78J. Extended benefits provisions make it possible to 
collect benefits for up to 50 weeks in Canada versus about 
half that in the United States Since Canadian employers 
are not penalized for seasonal employment practices the 
unemployment insurance system in Canada probably encourages 
this type of behavior.
These differences between the two systems would be seen
within the neo-classical framework as evidence of
significant barriers to adjustment in the case of Atlantic
Canada. However studies reviewing the impact of 
liberalization of the Canadian unemployment Insurance system 
after 1971 point to a maximum increase in the unemployment 
rate of 1.5 porcent[79]. Given the ten percent differential 
between unemployment rates in New England and Atlantic 
Canada, it appears that the unemployment insurance system is 
not a significant barrier to adjustment. New England bears 
no lessons in this respect for Atlantic Canada.
The proposition that high levels of unionization within 
a workforce hampers mobility of labour and prevents the 
price of labour from adjusting to demand represents another 
disruption of market forces within the neo-classical 
prospective. Table 28 suggests that New England is in a 
better position than Atlantic Canada in this regard.
However, two thirds of states in the United States have 
rates of unionization lower than the New England’s. The 
American average is skewed by highly Industrialised states 
in the northeast[801. In addition, nineteen states had
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Table 28
Extent of Union Membership 
In New England, Atlantic Canada, 
United States and Canada 
(Percent)
(1980-81)
Percent of Payed 
Workers in Unions
Newfoundland 49.6













Source: Statistics Canada, U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics.
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rlght-to-work legislation in 1980 and none of these were in 
New England[81]. While union membership may prevent 
adjustment to some extent. Now England’s relative 
disadvantage in this respect does not seem to have harmed 
its progress in recent years.
Wages and Salaries
In economic theory, when demand for labour falls off,
30 do relative wages if labour markets are free to adjust to 
changing conditions. This seems to have been the pattern in 
New England, where hourly wages relative to the American 
average fell during most of the 1970’s. Wages in 
manufacturing production had fallen to 87 percent of the 
national average by 1976[82]. Wages have begun to climb in 
recent years due to tight labour markets resulting from slow 
labour force growth, high demand, and the lowest 
unemployment rate of any region in the United States. Table 
29 provides an overview of relative wage structures in the 
United States.
High participation rates and. increasing wage levels 
have seen income per person jump to 117 percent of the 
national average in 1987[83]. This 1» up from 111 percent 
in 1983 and 103 percent in 1978. The relatively high per
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Table 29
Average Hourly Earnings of Manufacturing Production Workers 
In Selected States Relative to the U.S. Average
(percent)























































































Source: U.S. Dept, of Labour
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capita Income in New England is another difference between 
it and the Atlantic region. Per capita personal incomes in 
the Atlantic region declined from 74.9 percent to 74.8 
percent of the national average from 1979 to 1983[84].
While improvements have been observed, these relate more to 
growth in government transfers to individuals than gains in 
earned income. The Atlantic region and New England are 
being drawn in opposite directions in terms of hourly 
earnings and income per person. From this perspective, it 
would seem that the transfer dependence perspective has some 
validity.
The Atlantic region also has a history of hourly wages 
significantly below the national average, Table 30. 
Convergence on a national average wage rate has not been 
observed. If anything the gap is becoming wider. This 
reflects a lack of adjustment in the neo-classical sense, 
and provides some evidence that other factors are at play. 
Lack of adjustment due to poorly functioning labour markets 
may be part of the problem. However, it appears low wages 
alone will not spur industrial development. Other factors 
are clearly involved since barriers to adjustment, various 
labour market imperfections, tend to slow and not stop the 
adjustment process. For example, high average skill levels 
and a relatively stable labour force also contribute to New 
England's comparative advantage. Growth in Atlantic Canada 




Average Hourly Earnings of Manufacturing Production Workers 
By Province, Relative to the Canadian Average.
(percent)
1978 1980 1985 1
Atlantic
Newfoundland 92.5 90.1 86.9
Prince %rd Island 61.9
Nova Scotia 88.2 88.4 88.1
New Brunswick 91.2 90.5 87.8
Central
Quebec 90.9 92.1 94.1
(intarlo 100.6 99.8 100.3
West
Manitoba 87.9 87.9 85.9
Saskatchewan 106.7 107.2 100.3
Alberta 109.1 112.4 106.5
British Columbia 130.8 132.1 129.5
1) April
Note: Data for hours and earnings refer to hourly rated
wage earners on manufacturing payrolls only.






The tax advantages of living and working in some of New 
England’s states are often pointed to as a big factor in the 
recent growth record of this region. New Hampshire and 
Connecticut after all have no personal income tax and 
Massachusetts, once called "Taxachusetts", had one of the 
lowest revenue burdens (the revenues collected by state and 
local governments measured as a percentage of residents’ 
personal Income) in the United States in 1986[85]. The 
evidence suggesting that low taxes are at the root of growth 
is not convincing, however. The question well might be 
asked: What came first, rapid growth or lower taxes?
Table 31 shows that while some New England states have 
lower rates of corporate tax than others, the region as a 
whole compared poorly with other states. With respect to 
personal taxes, the tax burden in New England is low, 
compared to adjacent states in the Northeast, but more 
ffivourablo tax environments can be found in the southern and 
western region. Table 32 shows state personal effective 
income tax rates for New England. Rates for four of the six 




State Business Taxes (1)
(Percent of Net Business Income Given to Taxes) 






Maine 9.1 (13) 10.8 (13)
New Hampshire 9.4 (11) 13.1 (10)
Vermont 9.8 (10) 15.5 (6)
Massachusetts 11.2 (4) 14.6 (9)
Rhode Island 11.0 (5) 14.6 (8)
Connecticut 10.7 (6) 20.1 (3)
New England 10.2 (1) 14.1 (1)
Middle Atlantic 9.5 (2) 11.7 (3)
East North Central 7.8 (4) 9.8 (4)
West North Central 6.5 (7) 5.5 (7)
South Atlantic 5.7 (8) 5.8 (6)
East South Central 5,6 (9) 3.8 (8)
West South Central 6.8 (6) 3.6 (9)
Mountain 7.2 (5) 8.3 (5)
Pacific 8.7 (3) 11.8 (2)
United States 7.7 7.9





Source: W.C. Weaton. Interstate Differences in the level of




Individual Income Taxes 
As a Percent of Personal Income
1972 1977 1980 1982 1983
Rate Change 
72/83
Maine 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.4
New Hampshire 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
Vermont 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.2 -0.3
Massachusetts 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.3 0.7
Rhode Island 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.4 0.9
Connecticut 0.4 0.2 0.3 0,3 0.3 -0.1
All States 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 0.2
Source: The New England Council, Inc.
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Lover tax burdens in Massachusetts In the mid-1981)' s 
are related to tax roll-backs[86] while rapid growth in 
personal and corporate incomes kept revenues rolling in. 
Table 33 shows that taxes payed per person in New England 
were higher than in most regions of the country.
Tax competitiveness appears to bo more a preoccupation 
of legislatures than a comparative advantage. Evidence 
suggests that state and local taxes exert only a minor role 
in the location decisions of firms[86J. Other factors such 
as wage rates, market access, resource endowment, economic 
base, and so on, are more critical.
This situation similar in some respects to the Atlantic 
region where both personal and corporate taxes are among the 
highest in the nation, Table 34. However, The Atlantic 




Taxes Paid For Person 







Maine 863 255 46
New Hampshire 435 24 95
Vermont 858 271 65
Massachusetts 1,137 543 146
Rhode Island 890 73 25
Connecticut 1,102 92 154
New England 1,017 332 126
Middle Atlantic 1,039 402 100
East North Central 864 282 75
West North Central 848 291 57
South Atlantic 791 228 56
East South Central 711 120 24
West South Central 759 65 20
Mountain 869 193 41
Paoif1c 1,107 357 116
United States 900 267 74
Source: U. S. Dept. of Commerce.
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Table 34












Newfoundland 12/16 60.0 12
Prince Edward Island 10(b) 52.5 10
Nova Scotia 10/15 56.5 10
New Brunswick 9/14 58.0 10
Quebec 3/5.5/13 (c) 9
Ontario 0/14/15 49.2 7
Manitoba 10/16 54.0 6
Saskatchewan 10/14 51.0 5
Alberta 5/11 38.5 0
British Columbia 8/16 44.0 7
Notes.
a) Federal tax credit is 10% of corporate tax base
b) All provinces except PEI levy differential corporate 
Income tax rates on small business and others : Quebec 
and Ontario also levy a third and higher rate on 
Corporations not in manufacturing or processing, 
farming or the extractive industries.
C) Quebec’s rates under its own schedule range from 13* to
33% of taxable income subject to a tax reduction of 3%
of tax payable.





Many of the factors which explain the recent success of 
the New England region are best explained within the 
neo-Schumpeterian paradigm. This approach is based on the 
study of innovation policies has been called the “systemic 
approach", a term which reflects its focus on ’process’.
This process involves intensive interactions of all elements 
of society with special roles for entrepreneurs, technology 
and governments in the innovation process[88]. In addition, 
since the paradigm is highly practical in its approach, 
focusing on case studies as the appropriate method of 
analysis, it has a strong policy orientation.
The systemic approach is most properly described as 
being in a "pre-paradigmatlc" stage of its development[89]. 
While some aspects of the innovative process and the role of 
entrepreneurs and technical change are understood, the way 
these factors along with a variety of structural, 
institutional, socio-political and cultural factors 
interlink to produce technological change and innovation is 
not well defined. It may be that the complex interaction of 
the various factors together with interdisciplinary nature 
of its proponents, will combine to defy vigorous testing and 
the molding of acceptable theoretical parameters.
While identified with Schumpeter, due to the strong 
focus on the innovative process and the role of technology 
and entrepreneurship, this paradigm is easily linked to the
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post-Keynesian approach. In contrast to the neo-classical 
approach which distributes income according to the marginal 
productivity of factor inputs, post"Keynesian theorists 
maintain that income shares are determined by social and 
political institutions. The future is not predictable in 
the exact sense of the orthodox theorist. Its focus is to 
explain the real world as observed empirically. Economies 
do not tend to equilibrium and governments have a 
significant role to play in distributing growth.
Much woolliness has surrounded the concept of 
technology in orthodox economics. Changing technology is 
seen as shifting production possibility curves, rather than 
an influence on the factors and institutions of production. 
It is seen as embodied in the capital stock figure and since 
it acts over a long period of time it is considered to be 
exogenous in most production functions. Technology in the 
systemic world has a broader definition which includes not 
only improvement in capital equipment but new techniques of 
organisation, marketing and management.
Borne insight is gained into the roJe of technology in 
the Innovation process by a review of product life cycle 
theory[90]. This school of thought, which draws on orthodox 
trade theory, sees three distinct stages of growth in the 
life cycle of a product - innovation, growth, and 
standardization phase. The theory also recognizes the 
inevitability of a stagnation phase. The innovation phase, 
the introduction of a new good or service, demands ongoing 
research and development, product adjustments and testing,
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is high coat and high risk, and la relatively labour 
intensive. Initial production is for a narrow region or 
market. For this reason, innovation usually takes place in 
a techno]ogy-rich area usually close to the homo base of the 
firm involved.
The growth phase evolves from an upswing in demand from 
outside the immediate area and leads to the use of process 
technology, usually capital intensive, to meet new demands 
efficiently. Standardization means lowest cost production, 
involving large scale production, to take advantage of scale 
economies, and peripheral locations, to take advantage of 
low labour costs. Thus each phase of the cycle can have a 
different spatial orientation.
The relevance of this pattern to the pattern of growth 
in New England is clear. Innovation was the result of the 
activities of entrepreneurs making use of technological 
breakthroughs made at the various universities, institutions 
and companies, within the confines of the supportive network 
of the local research community. Aided by availability of 
capital for risky innovations, entrepreneurs took advantage 
of low local labour costs within New England to meet initial 
demand by building plants locally, the standardization 
phase. As the innovation aged and the technology that 
spawned it became more readily available, local innovative 
companies, now grown large, looked to cheaper locations and 
more favourable business environments to stay price
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competitive. Sometimes this meant leaving the state of 
Massachusetts for New Hampshire, sometimes it meant leaving 
the U.S.
The key to New England’s success is the building of 
Innovation on innovation. The macroeconomic trend is 
therefore derived by the sum of the actions and decisions 
made by all the actors in the economy. It Is the pace of 
innovation which gives life to the New England economy. The 
innovation phase is the phase of highest employment 
creation, the phase that is most labour intensive. The 
Atlantic region, on the other hand, seems far removed from 
the development based on innovation. Potential for job 
creation is limited by the resource nature of the Atlantic; 
economy and poor Integration of the main sectors of the 
economy.
The neo Schumpeterian approach sees technology wielded 
by the entrepreneur as the agent of economic change. This 
focus on the entrepreneur sometimes manifests 1tsn1f in a 
conflict between free market and interventionist 
ideologies. However, In reality bureaucracy and red tape 
are not limited to the public sector Private bureaucracy 
is often just as stifling. This is no to say that public 
policy designed to remedy distortions will not sometimes 
create new problems that are more serious. After all, the 
public sector is not a uniform entity but consists of many 
parts which make décision.*? based on an incomplete perception 
of the whole and a healthy level of institutional self
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interest. Conflicting and even harmful policies can be the 
result. Policies are confined by these institutional 
factors.
Entrepreneurshi p
Within the systemic paradigm, growth is based on 
innovation, particularly innovation by entrepreneurs. There 
appears to be significant variation in geographic 
concentration of entrepreneurs, depending on the fertility 
of the entrepreneurial environment. A fertile environment 
may include; good access to information and expertise, high 
rate of entrepreneurial start-ups and failures, and a 
technical culture adapted to a specific type of innovation.
Entrepreneurs do not thrive in an environment dominated 
hy bureaucracy. While this perception often leads to a 
conflict between free market and interventionist ideologies, 
bureaucracy is, within this approach, recognised as 
collection of limiting structural and institutionalised 
rigidities which reduce efficiency. Bureaucracy is not 
limited to public or private legal status[90]. Corporate 
bureaucracy can limit innovation in the same way as
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government red tape. Government policy has the potential to 
either limit or encourage innovation where the private 
sector can not or will not take the lead.
Definitions of the role of an entrepreneur in an 
economy are numerous and notoriously broad. One that is 
appropriate to this paradime is offered by Sweeney.
An entrepreneur then is someone who by a combination of 
knowledge, skills, creativity, imagination and 
intuition perceives an opportunity in the market for a 
new product or service and who, spurred by events and 
feelings, makes the decision to invest in this 
opportunity by founding a new firm and by organising 
this firm to survive and grow. Whether the opportunity 
is a technological innovation, a new use of existing 
teclmology, a creative design or a new way of 
satisfying user needs, the entry of the new firm 
creates change in the market, The entrepreneurial 
event is the dynamic of growth!91].
Most observers of the New England rapid growth 
experience identify entrepreneurial spirit as a key factor 
in the region’s economic performance[9Ü]. The focus on risk 
taking seems to be a phenomenon just as associated with 
culture and confidence as with technology or capital. A 
study by Professor Edward Roberts of MIT demonstrated that 
entrepreneurs usually share similar family backgrounds, 
motivations, and educational attalnment[93]. The 
concentration of entrepreneurial talent in New England seems 
to be related to a long history of innovation and the
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presence of quality research institutions. New England’s 
role as the 'workshop of the new world’ left its mark on the 
region’s mentality. The technical culture of the region 
seems to be one of innovation and adaptation, innovation 
built on traditional skills and adaptation drawn from a 
history of success.
Another factor in the high rate of entrepreneurship in 
the region is the presence of top quality universities and 
research institutions. These institutions tend to attract 
top quality students and teachers who tend to remain in New 
Englandl94]. Institutions in New England, MIT in 
particular, have a history of encouraging entrepreneurship. 
"The culture of these schools is geared to going out and 
doing, working in the private sector, finding commercial 
applications for research and starting a business of one’s 
own"[95]. Previous sections have already describes how a 
host of companies have spun off research which began at 
MIT. Companies started by former employees of other 
companies, are also very much in evidence in New England.
Entrepreneurs also need the cross-fertilisation of 
talent and ideas that come from an existing base of similar 
companies and sympathetic universities. The existence of a 
substantial and long standing business infrastructure is key 
to entrepreneurial growth. The knowledge intensive nature 
of New England Is a vital component of its cntrcpreneiarial 
based growth.
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The geographic concentration of entrepreneura has clear 
implications for the relative pace of economic growth. The 
innovation phase of the product cycle is the most vibrant- 
Employment is created more rapidly at this stage than any 
other. A region which has a high degree of innovation 
relative to the other more stable often capital intensive 
stages of product development can be expected to experience 
rapid growth In incomes and employment. A study conducted 
by the Bank of Boston provides some empirical evidence of 
this[96]. This study showed that growth is high in the 
early years of high-technology firms, but slows as these 
companies mature. The study revealed that jobs at mature 
companies increased at a rate of 1.9 percent between 194b 
and 1974, but by 10.8 percent for innovative companies and 
40.7 percent for new high-technology companies.
The Atlantic region, on the other hand, lacks the same 
type of entrepreneurial base. Efforts at establishing links 
between universities and industry, with a few exceptions, 
have taken place only recently and are still 
underdeveloped. Government policy has been focused on 
attracting industries producing products in the maturity 
phase where low labour costs and capital intensity are the 
main characteristics. Subsidies of capital equipment end up 
as the main tool of government policy. Figure 6 shows that 
spin-off activity is rare in the industrial sector in 
Atlantic Canada, while successful entrepreneurial efforts 
are often the subject of outside acquisition.
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Hefioarcrh and Development 
New Kngland has a large research and development 
infrastructure. The U.K. federal government provides 
substantlaJ funding and such expenditures have continued to 
increase during the past number of years as shown in Table 
3b. By 198b, U.S. federal research and development 
expenditures Now England were $4.5 billion U.S.. which is 
c o m p a r a b l e  to current annual research and development in 
Canada from all sources once the exchange is taken into 
account. Corporations added at least another $10 billion 
U.S. to New Kngland research and development commitments in 
1985. Table 36 shows that General Electric spent more on 
research and development in New England than all private 
sfîci.or firms in Canada during 1984.
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Table 35
Federal Obligations for Research and Development
For New England 
(millions of dollars)
(1973-85)
1969 1973 1977 1981 1985
ME 14 9 18 24 36
NH 31 31 33 55 130
VT 9 18 37 19 38
HA 775 954 1,472 2,407 3.269
RI 33 59 n o 183 334
CT 224 194 292 485 743
NE 1,086 1,264 1,961 3,173 4,550
US 15,355 16.486 22,841 31,930 47,176
Source: National Science Foundation, Federal Support to
(Iniversities, Colleges, and Selected Non-Profit 
Institutions, (1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985)
172
Table 36
Research and Development Expenditures 
By Leading Private Sector Companies 
In New England 
(millions of dollars)
Total B&D Expenditures 
* 1985 1984
General Electric Co. 2,553 2,304
Fairfield, Conn.
United Technologies Corp. 1,699 1,630
Maynard, Mass.
Xerox Corp. 814 717
Exeter, N.H.
Textron Inc. 605 564
Providence, R.l.
GTE Corp. 313 265
Stamford, Conn.
Union Carbide Corp. 280 268
Danbury, Conn.
Raytheon Co. 260 236
Lexington, Mass
Wang Laboratories Inc. 182 181
Lowell, Mass
Data General Corp. 128 102
Wostbourough, Mass.
New England's Top 75 9,500 8,500
Source: New England Business, "R&D Heats Up", (November 3, 1986)
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Table 37 shows that research and development activities 
in Canada during 1984 were about $5.5 billion Cdn., about 
one percent of the nation's gross national product compared 
to $119 billion U.S. in the United States, representing 2.8 
percent of total output. Only about five percent of research 
and development activity takes place in Atlantic Canada 
while almost nine percent of U.S. research and development 
takes place in Connecticut and Massachusetts alone.
The Atlantic region receives about nine percent of 
federal spending on research and development. Much of this 
js concentrated in the environment category (Table 38) due 
to the degree of fisheries research taking place. Very 
little research and development in in the area of national 
defence. Private sector research in Atlantic Canada Is 
almost nonexistent, representing about one percent of the 
total undertaken in Canada in 1984. As noted in Table 37, 
this is well below the national average were over bO percent 
of all research and development is from the private sector.
It is clear from this that the research and development 
base, so important to Innovation, is vastly superior in New 
England, compared to most areas of the United States. 
Atlantic Canada, in contrast, is well behind the rent of the 
nation in research and development, while Canada itself is 
well behind the United States.
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Table 37
Research and Development Expenditures In Canada 
By Source of Funding 
(millions Of dollars)
(1984)
Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Canada Atl,
Federal Gov. 46 7 119 29 2,158 9.3%
Provincial Gov. 2 3 3 321 2.5%
Industry 5 1 12 10 2.305 1.2%
Institutions 4 1 13 6 270 8.9%
Non-Profit
Organizations 3 3 2 157 5.1%
Foreign 3 1 253 1.6%




Federal Research and Development Expenditures 
By Major Category 







Medical and Natural Sciences 12.3
Other 11.0
Dept, of National Defence 8.0
Energy, Mines and Resources 6.7
Atlantic Energy 6.4
Industry, Trade and Commerce 0.4
Total 139.0





TBo basis of the syatemic/neo-Schumpeterian approach is 
that, the process of growth and development is based on 
innovation, especially innovation by entrepreneurs; that 
innovation is increasingly baaed on access to basic 
scientific research; and that growth can be influenced in a 
positive country specific or region specific way by 
government policy(H7]. However, this approach does not 
advocate unbridled government involvement in the economy. 
Governments shape and mold rather than create economic 
activity. The approach recognizes the interdependence 
between technology, economics and politics and is critical 
of many of the more interventionist policies of governments 
have used to promote technological growth.
Under pressure of competition and high domestic 
unomployment rates, governments around the world have 
dove]oped a rich variety of innovation policies and 
measures. Most focus on the same ‘high tech' areas, space, 
micro-electronics, micro-optics, computers, bio-technology, 
and so on. The use of incentives, particularly tax 
Incentives, is viewed as less than efficient. Incentives 
add to the complexity of an already complex system, and tend 
to stimulate the imagination of accountants rather than 
entrepreneurs and scientists[98j. In the case of research 
and development the confidence in the potential profits from
1
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the research are more Important than marginal reductions in 
the cost of the research through various government 
assistance mechanisms[99].
Many so called innovative policies are designed to do 
no more than to perpetuate existing structures. For 
example, institutional barriers make educational systems 
slow to change and adopt now technology. In addition 
innovative policies are often implemented hy some 
departments in conflict with the anti innovative policies of 
other departments. Bureaucratic pressures within 
government, tend to see much of the avallahle assistance 
captured by large companies in central regions. 
Administrators tend to favour dominant companies rather than 
the challenger, thus reducing the potential for 
competition!; 100].
The role for government is one of providing an 
appropriate environment for innovation by making available 
appropriate information, recognizing the value of human 
capital in applications for assistance, coordinating the 
various sectors of society toward common objectives, and 
acting as a rudder directing the little money available for 
discretionary expenditures toward more future oriented 
projects.
State governments in New England have bad a significant 
impact on the economic growth in recent years. Attitudes of 
government towards business (taxes) have been cited as a key 
motivation for locating in New England!101j. In addition, 
state governments htive made a special effort to encourage
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buslnens start-ups and expansions with capital and technical 
assistance. The government sponsored Massachusetts 
Technology Development Corporation, for example, undertakes 
venture capital financing in amounts between 100 and 250 
thousand doliara[102]. Massachusetts in fact has the most 
sophisticated mix of public development finance institutions 
in the United States[103].
Some states provide a "one stop shopping centre" in the 
state government for business seeking information on site 
location, licensing requirements and state Incentive 
programs. The Finance Authority of Maine (FAME) was created 
to bring a variety of financing programs under the control 
of one agency[104]. The New England States have been among 
the first to centralize business related programs.
Now England states have pioneered special ways of 
achieving business, labour and government cooperation. The 
Commission on the Future of Mature Industries formed in 
Massachusetts to deal with the problem of declining 
industries is a good example[105]. Many state governments 
in New England play a role of consensus builder when dealing 
with economic problems and developing policy. The 
commission drew members from government, academics labour 
and business. The New England states have launched major 
programs for customized job training to meet high 
technology's employee and special skill needs. One such 
program was the Bay State Skills Corporation in 
Massachusetts[106]. Appendix 6 details the available 
programs on a state by state basis. Although incentives
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vary, there appears to be a strong bias towards government 
loans and loan guarantees to provide low-cost financing. In 
summary, it would appear that state government incentives 
programs are, indeed, important in New England and It is a 
popular misconception that these governments play only a 
passive role with respect to industrial growth.
Neo-Schumpeterian theory would suggest that the process 
of government involvement in the economy is more important 
than the amount of money spent. Governments can not create 
industry but can guide them by making use of appropriate 
programs that do not involve excessive red tape. In 
addition the nature of a bureaucracy makes the giving of 
grants less than desirable. Grants often go to the larger 
Industries because those are the ones that the bureaucrat in 
used to dealing with. The small entrepreneur may find a 
multitude of programs confusing and have difficulty fitting 
the requirements of a given program. Even if a company 
manages to qualify the inventive may not be useful because 
of conflicting policies of other government departments. An 
incentive given by one department may be taxed away by 
another.
These are all familiar problems in Atlantic Canada 
Canadian Regional Policies developed since 194b, reflect 
influences ranging from neo-classical economics to 
dependency theory. While theoretical influences on policy 
have been large it also must be recognized that policies 
were often developed as an ad-hoc response to an immediate 
socio economic and political problem. Policies such as The
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Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act fPFRA.) of 1935 and its 
eastern counterpart, The Maritime Marshlands Rehabilitation 
Administration (MMRA), would fall into this category. 
Recommendations for a system of transfers to poorer 
provinces (equalization) grew out of the Rowell-Sirois 
Commission of 19401107] which was in part a response to 
serious disparities among the various regions of Canada.
Kven as regional theory became more refined in the 
1980'a and 1970’s the ad-hoc emergency response component of 
regional policy was a big factor in policy development. 
Perhaps the best example of an early regional policy in the 
emergency response category is the Maritime Freight Rates 
Assistance Act (MFRA) of 1927 which came out of the Duncan 
Commission on Maritime Claims[108]. The Duncan Commission 
was a direct federal response to the potential disruptive 
influence of the Maritime Rights Movement[109].
More recent ad hockery can be found in the expansion of 
the cipplication of the Special Areas program of the 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion after the Quebec 
crisis in the early 1970,s[110]. Even more recent was the 
dismantling of DREE and the creation of the Department of 
Regional Industrial Expansion whose focus was mainly the 
cyclical problems in central Canada caused by the 1981-82 
recession(l11]- Most recently the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency (ACOA) has been established[112].
Programs and policies designed to promote economic 
development in Atlantic Canada have often worked at cross 
purposes. Ridding wars for industrial plants reflect
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futility of competition between governments. The taxation 
of industrial development grants, thus reducing their 
effectiveness, is a clear case of government departments 
with conflicting orientations, free market departments 
verses interventionist departments, working at cross 
purposes with a net increase in complexity and a net 
decrease in effectiveness.
Regional policy in Atlantic Canada is focused on 
subsidising the establishment of low skill manufacturing 
plants, when the real long term security is at the 
innovation and design end of the product cycle, producing 
the intangible information and the prototypes that are the 
basis of rapid growth and quality jobs. Regional policies 
in Canada provide a good example of the faults identified by 
the systemic approach to economic development.
Procurement
While there is some evidence to suggest that the United 
States uses military and other procurement as a direct agent 
of area development, there is no doubt that through accident 
of history or through political leverage, New England has 
been a clear beneficiary of government largess. The main 
arm of this policy has been military procurement and
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miJitary related research and development. The degree to 
which New England is favoured in this regard has been 
discussed at some length in an earlier section.
The Atlantic region has not benefited to the same 
degree. Three factors are at play here, institutional or 
bureaucratic barriers, leakages, and the perceived conflict, 
evolving from orthodox notions of economic efficiency, 
between regional and national priorities. Leakages were 
discussed in the section on military spending. It was 
demonstrated that only a fraction of spending on procurement 
in the Atlantic region finds its way into the local 
economy- The opportunity to build an economic base through 
procurement in dissipated by leakages and inconsistent 
funding.
The institutional barriers recognized by the systemic 
approach are in full force in the Atlantic region. 
Discrimination in favour of established firms through ridged 
bidding practices, and supplier preference is common in 
Canada. Government contracts often reduce competition 
through continued use of narrow specifications.
Interference in favour of more politically powerful regions 
is not unknown. Single tendering is common in Canada, in 
fact the majority of government purchases are not tendered 
competitively.
Government procurement is recognized as an important 
lever in regional economic development within the systemic 
approach. This type of policy appears contrary to orthodox 
notions of efficiency. Central purchasing is seen as more
IB3
efficient. In reality institutional barriers tend to reduce 
competition and efficiency. Spreading the economic pie more 
fairly may in fact encourage new start ups in depressed 
regions, greater competition and Increased efficiency in the 
long run. Table 39 shows the current and potential 
influence of such a policy in Atlantic Canada. In the case 
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New England’s rapid growth in recent years is closely 
related to its status as one of the main centres of high 
technology in the United States, and indeed the world. This 
growth of high technology industries sees to have been more 
a product of historical circumstance, a long history of 
innovation, defence industry concentration and risk taking, 
than the result of a carefully planned development effort. 
While New England is at the geographical periphery of the 
U.S. it has been and remains a business centre for a variety 
of specialized goods and services.
While certain key factors found in the New England 
experience are common to any successful growth area, the 
fashion in which they are combined in this region is 
unique. These factors have been reviewed at some length in 
the preceding section in respect to their role in the 
process of growth in those six states. Their relevance to 
growth in Atlantic Canada was also addressed. Wliich factors 
are most important? Ranking factors in order of their 
influence on growth is a subjective process It is best to 
review all factors as a necessary part of the development 
process and not try and isolate one or more for study in a 
sterile artificial environment. it is the process that is 
important, not individual factors.
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Just as growth can not be explained by any one factor, 
a single economic theory can not fully explain growth as it 
has taken place in New England. However the preceding 
sections show that a review of a range of theory provides 
needed prospective in understanding the many forces that 
come into play. The elements which have come together to 
mold growth in New England are well documented. It is a 
simple task to establish a consensus on those that are most 
important. While the factors themselves are important, it 
is their theoretical grounding that brings them to life.
Knctors of importance include those contributing to 
agglomeration economies, a term associated with the regional 
.science perspective. These include an existing economic 
base conducive to the formation of economic linkages. 
Existing industries provide a base for future growth by 
providing a ready source of capital, labour, expertise and 
entrepreneurs for now firms. The defence establishment 
plays an important role in this regard in New England. 
Defence procurement, and funding for research and 
dovelopment at universities and by industry is at the core 
of much of the high technology development in the region. 
Quite simply. New England had a big head start in the major 
high technology sectors which have been at the hub of the 
recent New England miracle.
Another important aspect of New England’s economic base 
is the availability of capital, either in the form of ’old 
money' from established families, from merchant bankers, or 
more recently through venture capitalists. While there is a
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heavy concentration of capital in the region, the 
willingness of investors of various stripes to take risks is 
just as important. In New England, opportunities for 
innovation abound due, in large part, to the existing base 
of Industries. The abundance of opportunities attract 
investment which breeds success which in turn attracts more 
Investment. The rather unique, entrepreneurial rich, 
nature of the region’s universities together with their 
sheer size and number also contribute to the agglomeration 
effects. These institutions have not only been a prime 
source of research and development but are prime sources of 
highly .skilled personnel and all important entrepreneurs, 
agglomeration economies.
Where the regional science approach focuses on the 
nature of a region's economic base, the neo classical 
perspective recognizes the role of well functioning capital 
and labour markets In the growth process. It has been 
maintained that the rationalization and adjustment of 
traditional industries in New England helped the growth of 
new high technology manufacturing by freeing up labour and 
capital at just the right time The environment gen*!rated 
by allowing the adjustment pror;ess to work is one favourable 
to economic growth. High quality ski II .s are aval I ah le at 
reasonable prices. Emigration takes f;are of d i sp I aced 
workers not usefuI in the new high technology sectors, and 
tax rates are hold in check since a policy rcsponce i s not 
needed to accommodate either displaced workers or declining 
industries.
185
Wliilo growt-h and adjustment are explained in broad 
terms within the regional science and neo-classical 
perspectives, the all important role of the entrepreneur is 
not we]] developed. Another theoretical perspective, the 
neo Schumpeterian approach, develops this important aspect 
more fully. This approach outlines the process of 
innovation, the use of technology and invention by 
entrepreneurs to produce growth. It is extremely difficult 
to demonstrate the validity of an innovation theory because 
of the social complexity of the phenomena being studied.
This perspective does however recognize the integrated 
nature the process known as growth. It is this aspect that 
gives the paradigm its explanatory power and makes it worth 
consideri ng as a growth theory.
What does alJ this mean for the Atlantic region? In
reviowing various factors which contributed to economic 
growth in New England, it becomes clear that many factors 
have no application in Atlantic Canada. As a process, 
growth in New England is a unique combination of mostly 
indigenous factors. However a review of growth in New 
England provides some valuable insights into the problems of 
Atlantic Canada and some lessons for policy.
Atlantic Canada lacks a both the large and specific 
economic base needed to attract high growth industries. The
region has few head offices and very little private research
and development which might spur innovation. History shows 
that firms that are successful and not area or resource 
specific are often targets of acquisition and consolidation
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from outside the region. The industrial structure of the 
region show few signs of inter“industry linkages. While 
industry, educational institutions and government are 
clearly intertwined in New England, few explanations other 
than lack of lack of sufficient scale or the presence of 
barriers to equilibrium adjustment can be found in orthodox 
theory to explain the lack of growth in Atlantic Canada 
Other explanations are available if the range of available 
theoretical perspectives is expanded.
Defence spending plays the dual role of stimulating 
aggregate demand for New England's main high technology 
products and funding a vital research and development base 
in the region. Canada is simply in a different league than 
the United States in this regard. Defence spending in the 
U.S. and Canada tends to be very cyclical and highly 
politically charged. However, the U.S. uses military 
spending as a more overt regional development policy than 
does Canada.
While the availability of investment capital for 
traditional projects is adequate in most cases, equity and 
risk capital are more of a problem in Atlantic Canada. This 
is in contrast bo the array of venture capital firms and 
other sources of risk capital in New England. In this 
region financing is available for the non-traditional 
investments that tend to lead economic growth is more widely 
available. Differences in availability of capital may be 
relarted to the differences in tl#e hanking systems of the two 
countries, although this is by no means certain.
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The fragmented banking system in the New England (many 
independent banks within each state) tends to promote 
outflow of local deposits in the same manner as Canadian 
banks in their preconsolidation phase. It does appear, 
however, that some Atlantic business were starved of capital 
at rm*s ttme, a sitwattiion tl#at never oecwrred in New 
England. This historical fact, contributed in many ways to 
the present structure of the Atlantic economy. Recognizing 
this fact will not resurrect the ghosts of past businesses, 
and programs to make capital available now is probably a 
case of too little and too late
The size and number of educational institutions in 
Atlantic Canada can not compare to the base of institutions 
in New England. New England has been called the most 
education intensive region of the United States. Students 
from all over the U.S. and the world converge on New 
England's universities and institutes and a high proportion 
of the best and brightest stay. The scenario in Atlantic 
Canada is much different. While a high proportion of 
university aged individuals are involved in post secondary 
education many of the best and brightest leave. The old 
W a g e  th?)t the région" s largest export is brains rings tnae 
and has for some time. The emigration of the highly 
trained, leaves behind a population which demonstrates a 
level of education and training below the national average. 
This simple fact shows the important linkage between an 
industrial base that provides jobs and the institutions that 
train its workers.
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Canadian universities, with a few exceptions, do not 
promote integration with the business community or 
entrepreneurial, spin-off activity. Some of the efforts in 
this regard in the Atlantic region never got off the ground 
(Dalhousie University) or are still very new (Seabright 
Resources at Memorial University). Innovation related to 
university research and development is held back by both 
institutional rigidities and economic constraints. Research 
and development in Atlantic Canada does not have a big 
benefactor like the U.S. Department of Defence. There are 
nevertheless areas of world expertise in Atlantic Canada 
that could be developed with proper support and the 
elimination of institutional barriers.
The rationalization of traditional industries in Now 
England contributed to the recent resurgence by freeing up 
capital and skilled low cost labour. Resources were not 
spent on propping up declining industries and emigration was 
one of the prime solutions to plant closure Present labour 
shortages in New England, reflected in low unemployment 
rates and high participation rates, are a result of this 
emigration combined with a little hotter than average growth 
in employment. It is not clear that Atlantic Canada's 
problems relate to a lack of adjustment. Much oi the 
adjustment in "mature" industries in the region took place 
50-60 years ago. Studies of institutional barrier to labour 
mobility indicate that only a small portion of the high
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unemployment rates in Atlantic Canada can be explained by 
institutional barriers such as a liberal unemployment 
insurance system.
Low wages in the manufacturing sector are often pointed 
to as an outcome of adjustment and an important contributor 
to the resurgence in economic growth in New England. 
Manufacturing wages in Atlantic Canada have been well below 
the national average for decades. It has been argued that 
wages are not low enough because of minimum wages or other 
structural rigidities, or that adjustment is indeed taking 
place but that it is a long term process. Disparities 
between the Atlantic region and the rest of Canada, which in 
theory should be eliminated as an economy moves to 
equilibrium, are nothing new and in the 1980's some are 
higher than ever.
Business environment, most notably the tax burden that 
must be carried by business and individuals, is sometimes 
ment.toned as important in molding the pattern of recent 
economic growth in New England. However, many areas of the 
U.S. have more favourable tax environments than New 
England. Relative tax rates have affected industrial 
structure within the region. Disparities in tax rates among 
the New England states may explain an observed pattern of 
migration from the southern three states to the northern 
three by people and industry. Decline in tax rates in 
Massachusetts is a combination of tax moratoriums and 
rollbacks through referendum and rapid growth in taxable 
income of firms and individuals.
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The tax situation in Atlantic Canada is very different 
Rather than having some of the lowest taxes In the nation, 
as in New England, Atlantic Canada has the highest. 
Provincial governments spend most of their budgets on 
statutory services (health and education), infrastructure, 
and debt servi6ing. The practice of borrowing to provide 
basic services has put upward pressure on taxes and 
constrained expansion of services. To the extent that low 
taxes and restraint on the part of government creates a 
favourable environment for business, and there is some 
evidence of this in New England, Atlantic Canada is at the 
other end of the spectrum. The business environment In this 
region is distinctly unfavorable.
The process of innovation and its role in growth Is 
difficult to describe. In New England it has a high 
technological component and involves the interaction of 
entrepreneurs in a facilitating role, research and 
development in an Initiation role, and government in a 
supportive role. Entrepreneurs abound in New England. A 
high concentration of innovators in Now England reflects a 
large economic base of Industry, educational institutions 
and financial institutions that developed in an integrated 
and mutually nupportave way. The innovative process would 
not be as strong if even one aspect were missing.
There has been some debate regarding the apparent lack 
of entrepreneurs in Atlantic Canada. Atlantic Canada 
clearly lacks the economic base for large scale innovation 
in the manner of New England. More than this, the region
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lackn the coordinated approach to the process. Some have 
maintained that for mainly for social reasons, the region 
does not generate its share of entrepreneurs. Lack of 
opportunity for innovation, rusty entrepreneurial skills, 
and a series of institutional barriers seem to provide a 
more plausible explanation, however.
Research and development is not a priority in Atlantic 
Canada, or in Canada for that matter. The country and the 
region spend a very small percentage of output on research 
compared to the U.S. and New England. Where that research 
does take place in Atlantic Canada, it often takes place in 
isolation with little integration into the mainstream of the 
economy. Government regional development programs in 
Atlantic Canada are steeped in bureaucratic and 
institutional barriers to innovation. Assistance programs 
of various departments and levels of government are often in 
conflict. Aid programs are often administered in a fashion 
that favours established, usually large, companies. This 
tends to reduce the potential for healthy competition. The 
same problem is apparent with government procurement 
policy. Defence procurement in New England is more 
development orientation. Government programs for assistance 
to industry seem more coordinated and accessible than those 
in the Atlantic provinces.
The reasons behind the pattern of growth in New England 
are complicated. While contributing factors can be Isolated 
their contributions are as part of a growth process, all 
factors interacting with each other. The precise way these
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factors interact in New England is unique. Few direct links 
can be drawn to explain the pattern of growth in Atlantic 
Canada despite some similarities in history, geography, and 
proximity. There are some lessons that can be drawn 
however.
Economic base is an Important aspect in determining 
potential for growth in a given region. Policy in Atlantic 
Canada has focused on promoting the comparative advantage of 
the region. Often this has translated into continued 
support for primary processing of natural resources. The 
development of an economic base related to areas of local 
research and development expertise has been overlooked. 
Reliance on defence spending as a propulsive industry as in 
the United States may be unwise given the lack of scale and 
cyclical nature of this sector in Canada. In addition, the 
history of defence procurement in the U.S. shows that 
defence industries may not always be the most efficient 
innovators.
Growth based on Innovation tends to have desirable 
characteristics such as labour intensity and very rapid 
growth. In contrast, focusing development on attracting 
branch plant firms in the latter stages of the product cycle 
have little potential for spin-off activity. Their focus is 
on least cost production rather than research and 
development.
Government has a pivotal role in economic development 
as a coordinator, a source of information, a provider of 
uncomplicated and accessible assistance, all with the least
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amount, of bureaucracy. Government programs can often do 
more harm than good If goals are unclear and if policies are 
disjointed.
Educational institutions play an Important role as a 
key source of well trained workers. Universities can also 
play a more integrated role in the economy a sources of 
knowledge and expertise and as hubs of innovation.
The patterns of economic growth in the Atlantic 
provinces, like those in New England, are a function of many 
factors which are all part of an integrated and unique 
process. The theories and elements which explain observed 
patterns of growth in New England fall short when applied to 
Atlantic Canada. Growth and lack of growth are not the 
opposite sides of the same coin. Policies that may 
successfully promote growth in one area will not necessarily 
work In another. It seems that in order to promote economic 
growth first its nature must be understood. It may be that 
theories which explains events in a region in transition do 
not find the same application in a region where problems are 
more chronic.
Growth can be explained in terms of various theories 
and factors in combination. In the case of this study, 
growth in Now England has been tracked in terms of well 
known theories and growth factors. The same theoretical and 
empirical tools were found wanting when applied to Atlantic 
Canada. Assembling the appropriate theories and elements 
that explain growth in the Atlantic region of Canada is a 
task for another day.
Appendix A:
Statistical Profile of New England and Atlantic Canada
Source of American Data:
Raymond J. Waldroann and Robert A. Cohn, Business Investment 
in the United States: A Guide Eadej âl a D d _ In Ĝeative 
PrmgramM, f.awe. and Restrictions, Bureau of National Affairs 
Inc., Washington, 1984.
Maine
1. Investment Climate Indicators
Capital:’Augusu (21,819)
Major Cities (1980): 4. Auburn (23,128)




Population (1980); 1,125,030 Percent Black (1980):
Area (sq. mi.): 31,905 Percent Metropolitan (1980):
Pop. Density (1980): 36.3 Pop. Growth (% , 1970-80):
High School Graduates (% persons 2 5 + years, 1980): 68.5%
College Graduates (number, 1980): 101,782
Major Industries: Paper, leather, food, lumber/wood, transportation equipment 
Right-tO'Work Law: no 
Minimum Wage Law: yes
Employment (Jan. 198a) Total: 397,400 (Wage & Salary)
Manufacturing: 104,700
Wholesale & Retail Trade: 83,600
Government: 81,600
Services: 77,700 •
Transport & Utilities: 17,000
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate: 17,900
Construction; 14,9(X)
Mining: (included in services)
Manufacturing Value Added (S in millions, 1980):
Average Manufacturing Earnings (5/prod, hours, Jan. 1983): 
Union Membership (%, 1980):





Per Capita Income (% U.S., 1981, U.S. - 510,517):
State & Local Government Expenditures (5/cap., 1980):
Stale à Local Government Education Expenditures (5/cap., 1980): 
Federal Aid to Slate A Local Government (5/cap., 1981):




























1. Investment Climate Indicators
Capital: Concord 








920.610 Percent Black (1980):
9,304 Percent Metropolitan (1980)'
99 Pop. Growth (%, 1970-80):
High School Graduates (% penons 25+ years, 1980): 72%
College Graduates (number, 1980): 100,(XX)
Major Industries: Machinery, electrical equipment, paper and allied products
Right-to-Work Law: no
Minimum Wage Law: yes
Employment (Nov. 1981) Total: 444,615 
Manufacturing:




















Manufacturing Value Added ($ in millions, 1980): 773,441
Average Manufacturing Earnings (S/prod, hours, 1981): 7.99
Union Membership (%, 1980): 25.2




Unemployment (%, Dec. 1981): 7.6
Per Capita Income (% U.S.. 1981, U.S. - 810,517): 100
State & Local Government Expenditures (S/cap., 1980): 1,622
Stale & Local Government Education Expenditures (S/cap., 1980): 588
Federal Aid to Stale & Local Government (S/cap., 1981): 407


























1. Investment Climate Indicators 
Capita): Montpelier (8,200)
Major Cities (1980): 1. Burlington (37,700)
2. Rutland (18,400)
3. Bennington (15,800)
Population (1980); 511,456 Percent Black (1980):
Area (sq. mi.): 9,609 Percent Metropolitan (1980):
Pop. Density (1980): 53.2 Pop. Growth (%, 1970-80):
High School Graduates (% persons 25+ years, 1980): 70.5%
College Graduates (number, 1980): 58,000
Major Industries: Electrical equipment, machinery, paper, printing and publishing
Right-to-Work Law: no
Minimum Wage Law: yes
Employment (1982) Total: 264,000 
Manuracturing;




















Manufacturing Value Added (S in millions, 1980): 773,441
Average Manufacturing Earnings (S/prod, hours, 1981): 7.99
Union Membership (%, 1980): 25.2




Unemployment (%• 1981): 7.6
Per Capita Income (S U.S., 1981, U.S. " 110,517): 100
State & Local Government Expenditures (S/cap., 1980): 1,627
State St Local Government Education Expenditures (S/cap., 1980): 588
Federal Aid to State St Local Government (S/cap., 1981): 407
























4. New Bedford (98,478)
5. Cambridge (95,322)
1. Investment Climate Indicators 
Capital: Bostoi,
Major Cities (i980); 1. Boston (569,994)
2, Worcester (161,799)
3. Springfield (152,319)
5,737,037 Percent Black (1980);
8,257 Percent Metropolitan (1980);
732 Pop. Growth (%, 1970-80):
High School Graduates {% persons 18+ years, 1980): 74.1%
College Graduates (number, 1980): 769,528
Major Industries: Machinery, electrical/electronic equipment, instruments 
Right-to-Work Law: no 
Minimum Wage Law: no 







Manufacturing: 668,000 White Collar 57.4%
Wholesale & Retail Trade: 575,000 Blue Collar: 29.1
Government: 397,000 Service Workers: 13.3
Services: 657,000 Farm Workers: .2
Transport & Utilities: 120,000 100.0%Finance, Insurance St Real Estate: 162,000
Construction: 78,000
Mining: (included in services)
U.S, State
Manufacturing Value Added (S in millions, 1980): 773,441 23,221
Average Manufacturing Earnings (S/prod, hours, 1981): 7.99 7.01
Union Membership (%, 1980): 25.2 24.9




Unemployment (June 1982 %): 9.5 9,0
Per Capita Income (% U.S.. 1981. U.S. - 510,517): 100 106.1
State St Local Government Expenditures (5/cap., 1981): 1,622 1,762
State St Local Government Education Expenditures (5/cap., 1980): 588 563
Federal Aid to Stale St Local Government (5/cap.„ 1981): 407 465
Retail Sales (5 in billions, 1982): 1,075.7 29.7
Connecticut
1. Investment Climate Indicators
Capital; Hanford 
Major Cities (1980): 1. Bridgeport (142,546) 4.
2. Hartford (136,392) 5.







Percent Metropolitan (1980): 




High School Graduates (% persons 25+ years, (1980): 70.5 
College Graduates (number, (1980): 403,(X)0
Major Industries: Transportation equipment, machinery, fabricated metal
Right-to-Work Law; no
Minimum Wage Law: yes
Employment (Jan. 1982) Total: 1,417,700 
Manufacturing: 429,600
Wholesale & Retail Trade: 238,300
Government: 181,600
'Services: 287,300
Transport & Utilities; 42,100
Finance, Insurance it Real Estate: 113,500














Manufacturing Value Added (S in millions, 1980): 773,441 15,973
Average Manufacturing Earnings (S/prod, hours, Jan. 1982): — 8.00
Union Membership (%, 1980): 25.2 22.9




Unemployment (%, Dec. 1981): 8.9 6.7
Per Capita Income (% U.S., 1981, U.S. - 510,517): 100 124
State & Local Govemment Expenditures (5/cap., 1980): 1,622 1,583
Slate & Local Govemment Education Expenditures (5/cap., 1980): 588 552
Federal Aid to State & Local Government (5/cap., 1981): 407 377
Retail Sales (5 in billions, 1977): 724.1 10.4
Rhode Island
1. Investment Climate Indicators
Capital: Providence 








947,154 Percent Black (1980): 2.9
1,214 Percent Metropolitan (1980): 92
903 Pop. Growth (%, 1970-80): — 0.3
High School Graduates (% persons 254- years, 1980): 60.7%
College Graduates (number, 1980): 120,(XX) (estimate)
Major Industries: Jewelry, textiles, electrical machinery, primary metal, fabricated metal 
products, machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, scientific instruments
Right-to-Work Law: no
Minimum Wage Law: yes
Employment (Jan. 1983) Total: 383,400 
Manufacturing:
Wholesale &  Retail Trade:
Govemment:
Services:
Transport &  Utilities:





















Manufacturing Value Added (S in millions, 1980): 773,441 3,545
Average Manufacturing Earnings (5/prod, hours, Jan. 1983): —  6.81
Union Membership (%, 1980): 24.8 28.4




Unemployment (%, 1982): 9.5 10.2
Per Capita Income (% U.S., 1981, U.S. - 510,517): 100 99.5
Stale &  Local Government Expenditures (5/cap., 1980): 1,622 1,754
Stale it Local Government Education Expenditures (5/cap., 1980): 588 580
Federal Aid to Slate it Local Government (5/cap., 1981): 407 506
Retail Sales ($ in billions, 1977): 724.1 3.0
NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
PROVINCIAL AREA;
Island of Newfoundland 112,299 km2
Labrador 292,218 km2
Total 404,517 km2
~ as % of Canada 4.1
POPULATION (1985) 579,700
- % of Canada 2.3







Employment 174,000 176,000 177,000 7
Unemployment 40,000 45,000 48,000 7
Unemployment Rate (%) 18.8 20.5 21.3 7
Participation Rate(%) 52.1 52.9 53.3 7
Total Wages & Salaries 2,740 2,888 1,239 5
Average Weekly Wage ($) 384 401 426 f
- as % of Canada 92.1 92.4 95.1
*See Notes.
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
PROVINCIAL AREA 5,657 km2
- as % of Canada 0.1
POPULATION (JUNE, 1985) 127,000
“ as % of Canada 0.5




Employment 48,000 48,000 48,000
Unemployment 7,000 7,000 7,000
Unemployment Rate (%) 12.2 12.9 12.2
Participation Rate (%) 60.2 60.2 62. 1
Total Wages & Salaries 
(5 million) 585 614 264 5
Average Weekly Wage ($) 295 303 31 1
- as % of Canada 70.7 69.3 69.4
*See Notes.
NOVA SCOTIA
PROVINCIAL AREA: 55,491 km2
- as % of Canada: 0.6
POPULATION (JUNE, 1985): 879,600
- as % of Canada: 3.5












Employment 320,000 337,000 335,000 7
Unemployment 49,000 51,000 56,000 7
Unemployment Rate (%) 13.2 13. 1 14.3 7
Participation Rate (%} 57.4 59.3 58.8 7
Total Wages & Salaries 
($ million) 5,151 5,633 2,451 5
Average Weekly Wage ($) 350 371 384 f





- as % of Canada: 
POPULATION (JUNE, 1985):


















Unemployment Rate (%) 14.8 14.9
Participation Rate (%) 55.5 55.1
Total Wages & Salaries
($ million) 3,870 4,189
Average WeeJcly Wage ($) 370 391









NOTES TO TAB TABLES ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES
*Data for 1985 are either forecasts, or apply to the month indicated 
by numbers (1 - January, 3 - March, etc.) or are cumulative over the 
period up to and including the month indicated by number.
p = preliminary
Data are adjusted for seasonal variation where relevant.
Data for 1983 and 1984 are annual totals or, for labour force data 
and average weekly earnings, are annual averages.
Sources: Statistics Canada.
Appendix B:
GDP By Province, State and Industry
Cross Danestic Product by Province and iiriustry (%)
Industry Ptpyinoe and Year
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2.9 2.0 1.6 2.1
0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.9 2.0 1.1 0.7
Atlantic 
61 71 80 82
Newfoundland 
















3.7 3.8 3.0 2.5
21.6 22.9 21.9 20.2 26.5 29.5 28.5 27.8
7.7 7.0 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.0 3.7 4.0
2.2 2.6 3.2 3.5 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.9
3.8 4.8 4.2 3.6 11.2 13.4 11.6 6.5
12.3 12.4 13.6 12.2 11.0 9.5 9.3 10.0
8.9 11.0 6.7 7.4 15.8 20.1 7.6 9.9
1.9 3.0 4.8 4.9 2.2 3.9 9.8 10.7
P rin c e  E c ta rd  is la n d
61 71 BO 82
8.8 6.4 5.7 i;.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.8 3.0 2.9 3.1 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5.0 7.7 8.0 8.3
10.7 9.9 7.3 6.1 
1.3 2.6 2.2 2.1
Neva Scotia 
61______71 80 82
2.1 1.3 1.1 1.7
0.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 
2.5 2.0 1.9 1-9
2.9 1.8 2.2 2.9
11.1 12.3 13.9 12.6
7.0 8.0 6.3 6.9
2.0 2.6 3.1 3.5
new Urunswick 
61 71 80 82
3.2 1.9 1.2 1.7 
2 .1 2 .0 1 .6 1.2
1.0 0.8 0.5 0.6 
0.8 3.0 2.0 2 8
16.1 15.6 17.3 11.8
7.0 8.3 6.3 6.6 
1.7 3.1 3.9 3.4
8.7 9.5 10.8 11.0 6.9 7.0 7.7 7.5 10.1 11.0 13.0 12.8 9.2 10.0 12.7 11.9 11.3 10.7 9.6 8.9 8.9 10.0 11-6 11.8 12.4 13.8 15.5 15.5
11.9 11.8 12.6 11.8 11.6 11.4 12.0 11.4 12.7 13.2 13.0 12.7 13.4 12.2 14.0 13.3 12.6 13.7 14.7 12.5 13 q 13.0 13.2 11.9 13.3 14.2 14.3 13.5
12.5 11.5 13.1 13.7 13.5 12.3 14.7 15.1 11.6 10.7 12.4 12.5 10.0 9.1 11.7 12.0 12.6 11.2 14.3 13.5 13.3 ,3.0 ,3.3 ,3.0 11.5 10.0 11.6 12.1
17.9 19.3 19.7 20.5 18.7 20.1 21.4 21.7 15.1 15.2 14.7 15.1 8.4 8.7 9.2 9.4 13.2 15.5 15.0 13.5 37.9 39.0 39.0 17.8 15.9 14.9 14.2 15.8
• •
9.6 7.3 6.9 7.3 9.2 7.2 6.4 6.5 18.3 14.1 13.2 14.5 13.3 9.1 10.6 12.8 21.4 18.9 20.1 21.1 33,9 37.9 35,0 15.7 15.8 12.5 11.6 13.0
60.6 59.4 63.1 64.3 59.9 58.0 62.2 62.2 68.5 64.2 67.1 6^7 54.3 49.1 58.2 59.5 71.1 70.0 73.7 66.4 73.0 71.8 71.1 70.2 68.9 65.4 67.2 69.9
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 300 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
S o u rc e : T h e  C o n fe re n c e  H o a rd  o f  C a n a d a , e s tim a te s .
CROSS PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY IN CONSTANT 1972 DOLLARS 
(i ■llllons)
KassachuseC Ca Hew Ha»pahtre Rhode Island Vermont1979 1975 1972 1979 1975 1972 1979 1975 1972 1979 1975 1972
cal Cross Product 37,093 32.113 32.971 4,892 3.614 3.454 5,253 4.499 4,792 2,499 2.019 2.048
Pstm 78 80 103 25 28 36 10 10 12 103 84 109
Mlniac 17 18 29 7 8 10 3 3 5 46 25 29
CoDstructlon 995 1.156 1,764 246 167 212 168 160 231 110 91 128
Kanufacturlog 10.493 7.978 8.305 1,605 1,007 1,053 1,729 1,315 1,394 756 512 SOS
Durable 6,979 4,916 4.938 1,017 588 580 1,169 856 as 577 374 362
No adorable 3,514 3.061 3.368 588 418 473 559 458 as 179 139 143
Trade 6,312 5,665 6,006 880 658 596 875 774 846 414 338 345
Finance 6.363 5.926 5.685 690 526 474 793 722 673 281 245 255
Transportation 1.046 910® 989 93 97® 78 106 104 120 76 66 65
Comnunlcaclone 1.483 • 1.154 992 188 133 107 - 136 107 103 96 66 56
Public Utilities 806 876 871 110 103 96 102 114 126 59 60 58
Services 5.976 4.979 4.916 613 479 427 738 629 569 347 301 280
Covemment 3.523 3,372 3,312 434 409 364 592 560 713 245 243 224
•■Withheld CO avoid disclosure, 
e - estimated.
Note: The U.S. Department of Commerce la the source of deflators for cooverolon from current to constant dollars. These
deflators differ across Industries.
Source: Yedersl Reserve Bank of Boston.
a u is s  n o o o c T  ky xhoustxy ih  gohstjlm i 1972 noixAsts 
( i  m i l l l o w )
Heu England ConnecClcttt Maine
1979 1975 1972 1979 1975 1972 1979 1975 1972
Total Cross Product 77,812 65,658 66,356 22,951 19,102 18,925 5,124 4.305 4.165
Par* 386 382 481 73 81 107 96 100 114
Minins 87 72 99 46 25 29 2 4 5






























Trade 13,002 11,179 11,509 3.594 2,949 2,955 926 797 760
Finance 13,724 12,238 11,209 5,005 4,283 3.657 591 533 465
Transportation 1,996 1,757 1,810 505 425= 409 168 155 148
Communications 2.753 2,130 1,826 674 535 452 175 141 116
Public Utilities 1,673 1,707 1,686 484 437 428 112 112 107
Services 11,231 9,297 8,953 2,903 2,375 2,286 653 532 475
Covemment 7.093 6,812 6,772 1,627 1,618 1.578 671 610 581
a*Vithheld to avoid disclosure.
e - estimated. -
Note: The U.S. Department of Commerce Is the source of deflators for conversion from current to constant dollars. These
deflzcoTB differ across Industries. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Appendix G:
Migration Patterns By State and Province
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Newfoundland . . (13.0) (34.6) (20.8) (68.4)
prince Edward
Island ( 9.1) ( 2.6) (13.6) (10.6) ( 5.7) 2.9 (38.7)
Nova Scotia (58.2) 4.2 (37.0) (35.5) (43.5) 4.2 (165.8)
New Brunswick (33.9) (10.8) (40.1) (39.3) (45.3) 6.4 (162.5)
Quebec 55 5 ( 1.8) (17.1) 198.5 (142.6) (234.1) (141.6)
Ontario 164.3 79.5 270.1 701.8 236.1 96.4 1355.4
Manitoba ( 7.3) (43.8) (65.S) ( 5.7) (64.2) (69.1) (255.6)
Saskatchewan 15.4 (148.7) (202.2) (83.1) (123.5) (50.5) (595.6)
Alberta 39.5 (34.5) (15.2) 125.9 30.0 244.9 390.6
British
Columbia 119.7 85.7 224.7 244 .1 192.7 (214.9) 652.0
Notts Partnthcit* dtnett a n#t loi» in population.
source : i. b . Anderaon, Internal Migration in Canada 1921 - 1961. Economic 




Annual Average Dollar Exchange Rate 
(1965-1986)
Price of U.S. 
dollar in 
Canadian Cents
Price of Canadian 
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Inventories from the local personal property tax. h Limited to grants to ÿiGîlo subdivisions for
I Only munletpalltlas In I I  count let,, ................................................... I  Property tax exemption may be
k The state has no finance authority as such, but similar programmes are
Industrial site preparation.
evallabte In certain towns. .   ............—  —  —  .
available.. I Provides funds for site Improvements for Industrial purposes only
Soureet Department of Commerce of the State of New York.
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